Dakota State University

Beadle Scholar
Masters Theses & Doctoral Dissertations
Spring 3-2018

A Capability-Centric Approach to Cyber Risk Assessment and
Mitigation
Thomas H. Llansó
Dakota State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.dsu.edu/theses
Part of the Other Computer Sciences Commons

Recommended Citation
Llansó, Thomas H., "A Capability-Centric Approach to Cyber Risk Assessment and Mitigation" (2018).
Masters Theses & Doctoral Dissertations. 339.
https://scholar.dsu.edu/theses/339

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by Beadle Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Masters Theses & Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Beadle Scholar. For more
information, please contact repository@dsu.edu.

A CAPABILITY-CENTRIC APPROACH TO
CYBER RISK ASSESSMENT AND MITIGATION

A dissertation submitted to Dakota State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Science in Information Systems
March 2018

By
Thomas H. Llansó

Dissertation Committee:
Dr. Cherie Noteboom, Co-Chair
Dr. David Bishop, Co-Chair
Dr. Ashley Podhradsky
Dr. Surendra Sarnikar

ii

DISSERTATION APPROVAL FORM
This dissertation is approved as a credible and independent investigation by a candidate for the Doctor of Science in Information Systems degree and is acceptable for meeting
the dissertation requirements for this degree. Acceptance of this dissertation does not imply
that the conclusions reached by the candidate are necessarily the conclusions of the major department or university.

Student Name:

Thomas H. Llansó

Dissertation Title: A Capability-Centric Approach to Cyber Risk Assessment and Mitigation

Dissertation Co-Chair:

Date:

Dissertation Co-Chair:

Date:

Committee member:

Date:

Committee member:

Date:

Committee member:

Date:

Committee member:

Date:

iii

Acknowledgments
I have many people to acknowledge and sincerely thank:
•

My committee: Dr. Cherie Noteboom and Dr. David Bishop, whose careful guidance put me on a solid path forward in my dissertation work. Dr. Ashley
Podhradsky, whose domain expertise and enthusiasm for the dissertation topic
gave me great encouragement. Dr. Sarnikar, whose expertise in Design Science
was of tremendous value; I am grateful for his willingness to serve on my committee despite his transfer to another university.

•

The BluGen US Government Sponsor, specifically, Mr. John Garstka, of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
and Command, Control, And Communication (C3), Cyber, and Business Systems
(C3CB). The generous financial support from Mr. Garstka’s office allowed
BluGen research to go from high-level initial concept to operational research prototype in under twenty-four months.

•

My employer, the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, which
encourages and financially supports further graduate study for its employees.

•

The entire BluGen team, including Martha McNeil, Dallas Pearson, Brooke Boyd,
Dr. Michael Smeltzer, Dr. George Moore, Alyson Grassi, and Courtney Tse. Without the team’s energy, talents, and creativity, BluGen would never have become a
reality.

•

The two EVRA teams, who made time to support the research by participating in
the application of the EVRA methodology to the Omega system, thus providing a
crucial point of comparison for BluGen.

•

Last, but not least, my wife, Rochele, whose support allowed me to pursue this academic journey, a small part of our larger 34-year journey together (so far!)

iv

Abstract
Cyber-enabled systems are increasingly ubiquitous and interconnected, showing up in
traditional enterprise settings as well as increasingly diverse contexts, including critical infrastructure, avionics, cars, smartphones, home automation, and medical devices. Meanwhile, the
impact of cyber attacks against these systems on our missions, business objectives, and personal lives has never been greater. Despite these stakes, the analysis of cyber risk and mitigations to that risk tends to be a subjective, labor-intensive, and costly endeavor, with results
that can be as suspect as they are perishable. We identified the following gaps in those risk results: concerns for (1) their repeatability/reproducibility, (2) the time required to obtain them,
and (3) the completeness of the analysis per the degree of attack surface coverage.
In this dissertation, we consider whether it is possible to make progress in addressing
these gaps with the introduction of a new artifact called “BluGen.” BluGen is an automated
platform for cyber risk assessment that employs a set of new risk analytics together with a
highly-structured underlying cyber knowledge management repository.
To help evaluate the hypotheses tied to the gaps identified, we conducted a study comparing BluGen to a cyber risk assessment methodology called EVRA. EVRA is representative
of current practice and has been applied extensively over the past eight years to both fielded
systems and systems under design. We used Design Science principles in the construction and
investigation of BluGen, during which we considered each of the three gaps.
The results of our investigation found support for the hypotheses tied to the gaps that
BluGen is designed to address. Specifically, BluGen helps address the first gap by virtue of its
methods/analytics executing as deterministic, automated processes. In the same way, BluGen
helps address the second gap by producing its results at machine speeds in no worse than
quadratic time complexity, seconds in this case. This result compares to the 25 hours that the
EVRA team required to perform the same analysis. BluGen helps to address the third gap via
its use of an underlying knowledge repository of cyber-related threats, mappings of those
threats to cyber assets, and mappings of mitigations to the threats. The results show that manual analysis using EVRA covered about 12% of the attack surface considered by BluGen.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Background of the Problem
Merriam-Webster defines cyber as "of, relating to, or involving computers or computer networks (such as the Internet)" (Merriam-Webster, n.d.). A closely related term, cyberspace, is defined as: “A global domain within the information environment consisting of the
interdependent network of information systems infrastructures including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.”
(Committee on National Security Systems, 2010). Today cyber is ubiquitous; we interact with
it daily via smartphones, tablets, and laptops, but it is also all around us in critical infrastructure, avionics, automobiles, manufacturing robots, and "Internet of Things" (Xia, Yang,
Wang, & Vinel, 2012) components, such as medical devices, fitness bracelets, electronic assistants (e.g., Alexa, Siri, Cortana (Heater, 2017)), children's toys, thermostats, and even light
bulbs. The software in cyber devices is ever more sophisticated, visualizing protein structures,
recognizing faces, translating languages, predicting credit-worthiness, and diagnosing diseases.
While the benefits of applying cyber are significant and growing, so too are the associated risks. Cyber attacks can manifest in many forms, such as identify theft, intellectual property theft, ransomware, and website denial of service. They can be triggered, often anonymously, from great distances, as cyber-enabled devices of all stripes are increasingly interconnected across the globe. Experts especially worry about attacks with societal consequences,
such as attacks on voting machines, the electrical power grid, transportation systems, government services, and military systems. Along these lines, adverse events, and adverse cyber
events in particular, can lead to high consequence impacts, as illustrated in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Span of Adverse Events (Rausand, 2011)
The United States Government has grown more concerned about the cyber threat, including within the military, as evidenced by Section 1647 of the 2016 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) (Congress, 2016) (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Excerpt from 2016 Section 1647
Perhaps Congress was motivated by the 2013 Defense Science Board report titled "Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat" (Gosler & Von Thaer, 2013), which
stated:
The United States cannot be confident that our critical Information Technology (IT) systems will work under attack from a sophisticated and well-resourced opponent utilizing cyber capabilities in combination with all of their military and intelligence capabilities.
Regrettably, one might reasonably conclude from the headlines that little has fundamentally changed in the ensuing five years, making the quote as true today as when originally
written. Indeed, by nearly any measure, the magnitude of the problem has become staggering.
Cybersecurity Ventures estimates that cyber crime will cost the world $6 trillion annually by
2021 and that $1 trillion will be spent globally on cybersecurity from 2017 to 2021
(Cybersecurity Ventures, 2016).
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Against this backdrop, organizations that employ cyber systems to help meet their
business/mission objectives1 are concerned about the degree to which cyber attacks can put
those objectives at risk. Specifically, with respect to the growing cyber threat, they are interested in answers to a range of questions, such as the following:
•

What is my mission risk due to cyber and what mitigations help manage that risk?

•

Will the mission survive? Should I limit the use of cyber in the most critical cases?

•

As threats, missions, and cyber systems all evolve, how does mission risk change?

•

How much risk reduction can be achieved for a given funding level?

Security Architects (SAs) (Newhouse, Keith, Scribner, & Witte, 2017) are on the
front-line attempting to help answer such questions. SAs work with other stakeholders, such
as managers, mission owners, system owners, other systems engineers, and end users, to make
the best decisions possible based on the assessed risk and other considerations, such as funding levels available. SAs typically employ risk assessment methodologies and associated tools
to help answer these questions, drawing on others for information required by the assessment
process.
A primary output of the risk assessment process is a risk plot, e.g., Figure 3. The plotted data points represent cyber events, such as cyber attacks. Note the ordinal, six-point Likert-style (McLeod, 2008) scale used for each axis in this particular representation. The precise
visual depiction of the risk can vary across risk assessment methodologies, but it usually highlights potential cyber events (e.g., attacks) against cyber-enabled components scored by mission impact (also called "criticality" or "consequence;" we use these terms interchangeably)
and likelihood of occurrence/probability of success.

1

Henceforth, this document uses the term ‘mission’ to cover an organization’s business and mission

objectives. We note that in government settings, especially the military, the term ‘mission’ is commonly used.
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Figure 3: Typical Risk Plot (InsurTech, 2017)

Statement of the Problem
While the SA’s are Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) in cyber, their decision-making in
risk assessment context is often subjective and variable, leading to concerns about the rigor,
repeatability, and reproducibility of the assessed risk and associated mitigation recommendations (Peacos, 2016), (Hallberg, Bengtsson, Hallberg, Karlzén, & Sommestad, 2017). Other
concerns include the time and expense required to conduct such assessments. These issues become even more significant given the need to periodically repeat assessments based on the
evolution of the (1) anticipated threat, (2) cyber-dependent missions, and (3) supporting cyber
systems. In addition, there is growing interest in producing "real time" risk assessment
measures for critical systems, making manual assessment unrealistic. Meanwhile, the eventcentric approach so commonly employed for cyber risk analysis today has limitations, as captured in part by Aven (Aven, 2016):
Traditional risk assessments are based on causal chains and event analysis,
failure reporting and risk assessments, calculating historical data-based probabilities. This approach has strong limitations in analyzing complex systems as they treat
the system as being composed of components with linear interactions, using methods
like fault trees and event trees, and have mainly a historical failure data perspective.
An additional concern is the need to systematically and objectively identify mitigations that, if implemented, would reduce risk to an acceptable level. Mitigation analysis that is
informed by assessed risk and tolerance to that risk is commonly included in the risk evaluation treatment phases of risk analysis. Similar to the scoring of risk, mitigation analysis is typically conducted manually.
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Taken together, the concerns discussed above define a gap that the cybersecurity community has historically struggled to address. We return to and expand on these themes in the
Literature Review section below.

Research Question
The research question that we pose in this document is as follows: Is there a new approach to mission-cyber risk assessment that can significantly close the following gaps: improved repeatability and reproducibility of results ("repeatability/reproducibility gap"), improved coverage of the attack surface analyzed ("coverage gap"), and decreased analyst time
required ("time gap")?

Objective of the project
The objective of the project is to determine the extent to which the gaps mentioned
above are addressed by a new approach to assessing mission risk due to cyber effects called
“BluGen” (Llanso, McNeil, Pearson, & Moore, 2017)(McNeil, Llanso, & Pearson, 2018).
Specifically, the project assesses the degree to which BluGen provides greater coverage of the
attack surface and requires less overall SA time to execute for a target cyber system to be analyzed. These time and coverage results are compared to the same results for a representative
"first generation" manually-executed, event-centric risk assessment methodology. The project
deliverables consist of coverage comparisons, timing comparisons, and an analysis of the extent to which the results support the hypotheses.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
We begin the literature review with a basic definition of ‘risk’ and then move on to
discuss risk assessment methodologies. The methodology section covers four major categories: compliance-centric, event-centric, loss-centric, and capability-centric. Finally, the review
discusses related, cross-cutting topics relevant to cyber risk assessment: mitigation analysis,
vulnerability enumeration, human variability in expert scoring, and knowledge management.

Definition of Risk
The assessment and management of risk have been studied for many decades and for
many domains beyond cyber, including finance, insurance, healthcare, and military domains
including kinetic attack, radiation, and electromagnetic jamming. Despite this long history,
there remains a lack of consensus on a single definition of risk. As Kaplan stated in 1997
(Kaplan, 1997):
“Many of you remember that when our Society for Risk Analysis was brand
new, one of the first things it did was to establish a committee to define the word
'risk.' This committee labored for 4 years and then gave up, saying in its final report,
that maybe it's better not to define risk. Let each author define it in his own way, only
please each should explain clearly what way that is.”
Consistent with the quote above, we find many risk definitions in use (Table 1). We
note, however, that the definitions all have in common a degree of likelihood or uncertainty
with respect to potentially adverse events.
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Table 1: Examples of Risk Definitions
Source

Definition

NIST

“A measure of the extent to which an entity is threatened by a potential
circumstance or event, and typically a function of: (i) the adverse impacts
that would arise if the circumstance or event occurs; and (ii) the likelihood
of occurrence.” (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2012)

ISO 3100

“Effect of uncertainty on objectives” (International Standards
Organization, 2009)

Merriam
Webster

“Possibility of loss or injury” (“Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary,”
n.d.)

Investopedia

“The chance that an investment's actual return will be different than expected.” (Investopedia Staff, n.d.)

Society for
“Possibility of an unfortunate occurrence” (Various, n.d.)
Risk Analysis
The seminal 1981 paper by Kaplan and Garrick, "On the Quantitative Definition of
Risk" (Kaplan & Garrick, 1981) captured the essence of these definitions in a more formal
way, as follows:
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 = {< 𝑠𝑖 , 𝑝𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖 >}
In this definition, risk is a set of 𝑁 events, where an event is represented as a 3-tuple,
< 𝑠𝑖 , 𝑝𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖 >, 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑁. 𝑠𝑖 is a scenario (event/attack), 𝑝𝑖 is the probability of 𝑠𝑖 occurring
over some defined period of time, and 𝑥𝑖 is the consequence (impact) of 𝑠𝑖 occurring.

Risk Methodologies
Many existing cyber-related risk methodologies implicitly or explicitly define risk in a
manner consistent with the risk definition above, which we call event-centric. In addition to
event-centric methodologies, we define three other categories of risk-related methodologies:
compliance-centric, loss-centric, and capability-centric. Below, we discuss each of these categories, which are not completely orthogonal from one another, and we provide representative
examples of each.

Compliance-Centric Risk Methods
Compliance-centric risk methodologies help organizations comply with policies, such
as the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) (House Government Reform
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Committee, 2002) and the Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 8510.01 (US
Department of Defense, 2014). One such methodology that directly supports compliance is
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-37, titled
"Guide for Applying the Risk Management Framework [RMF] to Federal Information Systems: a Security Life Cycle Approach" (National Institute of Standards and Technology,
2010).
When applying RMF, one undertakes six major steps: (1) categorize an information
system, (2) select security controls, (3) implement security controls, (4) assess security controls, (5) authorize the information system, and (6) monitor security controls. Risk is analyzed
by considering mission impacts of cyber events in step (1). In step (1), the RMF references
two documents to assist in Information System categorization: The Federal Information Processing System Publication 199, "Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information and Information System" (National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
2004) and the NIST Special Publication 800-60, "Guide for Mapping Types of Information
and Information Systems to Security Categories" (Stine, Kissel, Barker, Fahlsing, & Gulick,
2008). Also, in step (1), one analyzes the potential loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability (C/I/A) of information of various types in a target system and rates the corresponding
mission/business impacts due to such a loss along an ordinal scale of Low, Moderate, and
High. One then takes the high-water mark rating across all information types as the overall
system categorization for the particular loss of C, I, or A. DoDI 8510.01 adopts the NIST
RMF, but makes modifications, such as the requirement to use the Committee for National
Security Systems (CNSS) Instruction 1253, "Security Categorization and Control Selection
for National Security Systems" (CNSS Instruction No. 1253 - Security Categorization and
Control Selection for National Security Systems, Version 2, 2012). CNSS is similar in concept
to FIPS-199.
Discussion. Compliance-centric risk-related methodologies tend to treat risk at a high
level. For example, CNSS-1253 considers risk in terms of mission impact/criticality only
without regard to the fact that impacts resulting from a compromise of C/I/A can vary for the
same mission information across different components of the system and at different times in
a given mission time-line. Distinct components might benefit from different mitigation strate-
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gies, but the analysis is too high level to differentiate. In addition, CNSS-1253 selects mitigations via lookup tables based on a high-level categorization process. If used alone without a
deeper consideration of the full range of risk elements (e.g., threat capabilities, missions, system components, defense capabilities, and mappings among them), one may end up unwittingly over-protecting less important assets, under-protecting more important assets, potentially wasting funds and subsequently imperiling missions. Similar compliance approaches are
in use in non-government settings. For example, the Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council (Orfei, Leach, King, Mauro, & Fitzsimmons, 2006), have likewise encouraged a
compliance-oriented approach to security with their PCI-DSS security standard.

Event-Centric Methods
Event-centric methods analyze risk by enumerating potential cyber events, such as
malicious cyber attacks, and scoring risk as a function of (a) mission impact/criticality and
(b) likelihood of occurrence or estimated level of effort to carry out. An event can be malicious (e.g., cyber attack) or non-malicious (e.g., operator error, software error, an earthquake
that knocks out electrical power to cyber components). Perhaps the most prominent example
of an event-centric methodology is NIST Special Publication 800-30, "Guide for Conducting
Risk Assessments" (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2012), summarized in
Figure 4.

Figure 4: NIST 800-30 Risk Assessment Framework
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Other examples of event-centric approaches include the International Standards Organization 27001 Risk Analysis process (ISO/IEC 27001:2013 - Information technology,
Security techniques, Information security Management systems, Requirements, 2013), Factor
Analysis of Information Risk (FAIR) (Carlson, Hutton, & Gilliam, 2010), and the Carnegie
Mellon Software Engineering Institute’s Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE) methodology (Caralli, Stevens, Young, & Wilson, 2007).
Discussion. There are several challenges with conducting event-centric assessments,
as typically practiced today. Such approaches usually require mission and SAs to manually
score mission impact/criticality and attack likelihood, respectively. However, manual scoring
does not scale well due to the combinatoric explosion that results when one attempts to enumerate all possible attack sequences that could be applied to a target system. For example, attack-based risk analysis of a system of 5 mission threads, 40 nodes (computing devices of various types), 3 data items per node on average, 4 attack vectors, and 3 attack effects can require
an upper bound of 7,200 (5 × 40 × 3 × 4 × 3) unique attack contexts that SAs must score
for impact and likelihood.
As a result of this combinatoric explosion, SAs tend to consider just a portion of the
attack surface by using small, commonly non-random samples, with attendant concerns about
how well such samples generalize to the entire attack surface. The result is limited attack surface coverage. Also, such assessments are time consuming and subject to the effects of SAbias in assigning scores along ordinal scales. Furthermore, the repeatability and reproducibility of such analyses are a concern. While modest progress has been made in automating impact scoring, e.g., (Musman, Tanner, Temin, Elsaesser, & Loren, 2011) and (Llanso & Klatt,
2014), approaches to automating full attack likelihood scoring remain in their infancy. Lastly,
to-date there is no clear-cut automation path that leads from attack-centric risk assessment to
mitigation analysis, though some related work is going on in this area (Vigo, Nielson, &
Nielson, 2014).

Loss-Centric Risk Methods
Loss-centric methodologies are similar to event-centric methodologies described
above but are more focused on quantifying dollar losses due to cyber events rather than on as-

11
sessing potential mission impacts. Two representative examples of such methodologies include the approach described by Seiersen and Hubbard in their book, "How to Measure Anything in Cybersecurity Risk" (Hubbard & Seiersen, 2016) and INFOSEC Institute's "Quantitative Risk Analysis" method (INFOSEC Institute, 2013). In the latter, one determines potential
annualized losses to attacks on assets. The key formula in methods similar to INFOSEC Institute's method is 𝐴𝐿𝐸 = 𝑆𝐿𝐸 × 𝐴𝑅𝑂, where 𝐴𝐿𝐸 is Annualized Loss Expectancy, 𝑆𝐿𝐸 is Single Loss Expectancy, and 𝐴𝑅𝑂 is Annualized Rate of Occurrence. In turn, 𝑆𝐿𝐸 = 𝐴𝑉 × 𝐸𝐹,
where 𝐴𝑉 is asset value and 𝐸𝐹 is exposure factor (percent of asset affected by a cyber attack).
Discussion. While potential dollar loss is certainly a reasonable focus for risk, losscentric methods that approach risk analysis via event enumeration suffer from the same issues
as the more mission-focused event-centric methodologies discussed above. Another challenge
with such methods is in accumulating enough data to make credible estimates of, for example,
ARO and EF. Finally, such methods do not apply as well in situations, such as national defense, where the focus is less about dollar loss and more about mission success and lives
saved.

Capability-Centric Methods
The capability-centric approach represents a recent departure from the more common
event-centric risk approaches. The idea is as follows: rather than attempting to enumerate and
analyze all of the attacks that an adversary might compose from their list of offensive capabilities, the analyst instead focuses on the base capabilities themselves. For each offensive capability, the analyst identifies potential defensive capabilities that could effectively mitigate the
offensive capability. Examples of offensive and defensive capabilities at different abstraction
levels are given in Table 2.
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Table 2: Examples of Offensive and Defensive Capabilities
Level

Example Offensive Capability

Example Related Defensive Capability

1

Threaten system availability

Defend system availability

2

Inject stealthy software implants

Detect and block most stealthy implants via
software whitelisting

3

Software implants are injected via
air gap jumping methods

Establish an authoritative repository of
cryptographic hashes of authorized software

Two example approaches that employ the capability-centric approach are BluGen
(Llanso et al., 2017), the focus of this dissertation proposal, and the capability-based approach
employed by the government program called "NIPRNet/SIPRNet Cyber Security Architecture
Review" (NSCSAR) (Dinsmore, 2016)2. BluGen is discussed in greater detail below.
NSCSAR focuses on common infrastructure assets used by many missions and considers the
degree of exposure of such assets to the anticipated threat, omitting mission impact/criticality
considerations.
Discussion. The central hypothesis of the capability-based approach is as follows: as
the individual capabilities possessed by an anticipated adversary are mitigated by cyber defenders using their own "defensive" capabilities, it becomes increasingly difficult for that adversary to compose viable attack sequences, because there are fewer and fewer remaining unmitigated "defensive" capabilities from which to compose such attacks. Of course, implicit in
this statement is the ability to enumerate the capabilities of the anticipated adversary in the
first place, but we believe that this is a more tractable challenge than, for example, enumerating all possible attacks that one could compose from the base capabilities. The 2015 threat
model (DoD, 2015) created for DoD provides an example of capability enumeration for the
six cyber attacker tiers defined by Gosler and Von Thaer (Gosler & Von Thaer, 2013).

2

The program name recently changed from NSCSAR to DoDCAR.
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Other Related Work
This subsection covers other related work relevant to cyber risk assessment, specifically mitigation analysis, vulnerability enumeration, human variability in expert scoring, and
knowledge management.

Mitigation Analysis
Once risk has been assessed, an important next step in the risk assessment and management realm is risk treatment, which examines potential mitigations (also known as countermeasures or security controls) to help manage risk. Representative examples include:
•

Step 2 of the Risk Management Framework (RMF) (NIST, 2010)

•

Step 4 of ISO 31000 (International Standards Organization, 2009)

•

Step 8 of OCTAVE (Caralli et al., 2007)

•

Step 2.1.2 of MITRE’s Threat Assessment & Remediation Analysis (TARA)
(Wynn, Whitmore, Upton, & Spriggs, 2011))

When looking across these steps, we find that they tend to be conducted manually to
one degree or another. For example, CNSS-1253 (CNSS Instruction No. 1253 - Security
Categorization and Control Selection for National Security Systems, Version 2, 2012), which
is a recommended approach for realizing RMF step 2, takes a hybrid approach, where the SA
consults a large security control table (Table D-1 of Appendix D, Security Control Tables)
and mechanically gathers a list of the mapped security controls specified for given levels of
mission impact based on breaches of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Such mappings can be blunt instruments, requiring further SA analysis. The SA then considers possible
application of “overlays” (list of controls recommended for particular circumstances, such as
systems that include cross domain solutions or that process classified information). Next the
SA revises the list (additions/deletions) based on local needs and maps the controls to applicable assets in the target system. An important part of mitigation analysis is consideration of the
larger tradespace of cost vs. benefit. The primary benefit is the degree of risk reduction resulting from mitigation. Cost can include a complex set of factors, such as the cost to acquire, integrate, and operate mitigations. Cost can also include negative impacts to the missions of the
system caused by use of the mitigations. An extreme illustration of a negative impact would
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be applying a screen saver that requires a password to an airliner flight deck display. Clearly,
such a mitigation could be disastrous during operations such as landing. Tradespace analysis
has received some attention in the literature, including work by Dewri, et al. (Dewri,
Poolsappasit, Ray, & Whitley, 2007) and Yevseyeva (Yevseyeva, Basto-Fernandes,
Emmerich, & van Moorsel, 2015). Dewri takes a multi-objective optimization approach based
on attack tree, whereas Yevseyeva employs ideas from portfolio optimization to select security controls. The BluGen team is in the process of considering potential application of genetic
algorithms to help search the tradespace of possible security architectures (no published work
yet).

Vulnerability Enumeration
Event-centric and loss-centric risk approaches discussed above depend upon the concept of vulnerability enumeration. By vulnerability enumeration, we mean attempting to identify and analyze all the vulnerabilities in a target system. For example, the “Conduct Assessment” step of NIST 800-30 (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2012), the Risk
Identification step of ISO 31000 (International Standards Organization, 2009), and phase 2 of
OCTAVE (Caralli et al., 2007) all attempt some form of vulnerability enumeration. While the
idea of vulnerability enumeration appeals to the intuition, we assert that for complex cyber environments, attempts at enumerating vulnerabilities will generally fall well short of the total
possible set. Therefore, the majority of events that depend on vulnerability enumeration in target systems will not be identified and the related assessment results will thus be incomplete.
Undercounts result from the failure to consider exploitation events tied to so-called "zero day"
vulnerabilities, that is, vulnerabilities that are known to only a few or not yet known by anyone. Underlying this viewpoint is the paper "Estimating Software Vulnerability Counts in the
Context of Cyber Risk Assessments" (Llanso & McNeil, 2018), which analyzes vulnerability
discovery rates and the rate of flaw and related vulnerability introduction during the development cycle. The paper combines the two rates in an equation that estimates the number of unknown vulnerabilities as a percentage of total vulnerabilities. The results are not encouraging,
with greater than 50 percent of vulnerabilities remaining latent.
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Human Variability in Expert Scoring
A theme running through the event-centric and loss-centric risk assessment methods
discussed earlier in this section is the routine use of human experts to enumerate events and
then score those events for likelihood of occurrence and mission impact. Using humans for
this purpose leads to concerns about repeatability and reproducibility of the results. The
phrase "inter-rater reliability" is used in the literature (Trochim & Donnelly, 2008) to refer to
this issue. As Trochim states:
“Whenever you use humans as a part of your measurement procedure, you
have to worry about whether the results you get are reliable or consistent. People are
notorious for their inconsistency. We are easily distractible. We get tired of doing repetitive tasks. We daydream. We misinterpret.”
While inter-rater reliability has been studied in general settings (Holm, Sommestad,
Ekstedt, & Honeth, 2014), (Bolger & Wright, 1994), we focus here on the risk assessment
context. Hallberg and his colleagues (Hallberg et al., 2017) studied inter-rater reliability with
respect to humans manually scoring the probability and severity of cyber events or incidents.
Their study involved 20 raters who scored 105 cyber incidents. After analyzing the results, the
researchers concluded that:
"The ratings of probability and severity are not reliable enough between
raters to be considered a sound basis for the quantification of information security
risks."

Knowledge Management
The discipline of knowledge management (KM) appears to have great potential in the
area of cyber risk assessment. Becerra-Fernández and Sabherwal (Becerra-Fernandez &
Sabherwal, 2010) define knowledge in a given area as “justified beliefs about relationships
among concepts relevant to that particular area.” Those same authors define knowledge management, in turn, as “doing what is needed to get the most out of knowledge resources.” Activities include the creating, updating, distributing, and employing of knowledge to help address organizational challenges, or, alternatively, per O’Dell and Hubert (O’Dell & Hubert,
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2011), “knowledge management is a systematic effort to enable information and knowledge to
grow, flow, and create value.”
We see the beginnings of knowledge management in cybersecurity that is relevant to
cyber risk assessment. For example, Llansó (Llanso & Engebretson, 2016) defined a model, a
subset of which is shown in Figure 5, that captures the details of and relationships between
cyber systems, the missions they support, and the cyber threats to which they are exposed.
The model, expressed in the Unified Modeling Language (Object Management Group, 1999),
captures cyber-related knowledge in six different segments of a unified model. This model
was highly influential in the development of the BluGen Reference Catalog (RefCat) discussed in this dissertation.

Figure 5: Unified Model for System Security Engineering (UAMSSE) subset
Other cybersecurity models that contribute to the area of knowledge management in
cybersecurity include the following:
•

D’Amico, Goodall, and Kopylec (Goodall, D’Amico, & Kopylec, 2009) defined a cybersecurity-related model, specifically an ontology that facilitates the mapping of
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cyber assets to the missions they support and the identification of users who employ
the systems composed of those assets.
•

NIST’s Special Publication 800-53 (National Institute of Standards and Technology
Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4, 2013) enumerates several hundred security
controls intended to be used as mitigations to cyber threats. 800-53 plays a key role in
the Risk Management Framework (NIST, 2010).

•

MITRE’s Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) (Mitre,
n.d.) repository is a rich inventory of cyber attack patterns.

•

The National Vulnerability Database (NVD, n.d.) is a highly structured inventory of
known vulnerabilities affecting cyber systems.

•

MITRE’s Mission Assurance Engineering (MAE) (Wynn et al., 2011) model maps
mitigations to threats (threats are expressed as TTPs (techniques, tactics, and procedures)) (Figure 6). The model also maps TTPs to asset classes. At a high level, MAE
has conceptual similarities to the BluGen RefCat, discussed later.

Figure 6: MITRE Mission Assurance Engineering (MAE) Data Model
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This section describes the research methodology used, including the placement of
BluGen in a Design Science research context, the hypotheses underlying BluGen, the BluGen
artifacts themselves, and how we explored those hypotheses. Chapter 4 then presents the results of that exploration.

Design Science Research
Hevner, et al. (Hevner, March, Park, & Ram, 2004) state that “Design science... creates and evaluates IT artifacts intended to solve identified organizational problems.” Vaishnavi and Kuechler (Vaishnavi & Kuechler, 2011) describe Design Science research as “the
creation of new knowledge through design of novel or innovative artifacts.” As BluGen consists of a set of designed artifacts, we therefore describe and evaluate BluGen with Design
Science Research (DSR) principles in mind.
While different authors approach DSR in different ways, this dissertation adopts the
approach described by Peffers, et al., in the 2007 paper titled “A Design Science Research
Methodology for Information Systems Research” (Peffers, Tuunanen, Rothenberger, &
Chatterjee, 2007). We follow the process in Figure 1, “DSRM Process Model” of that paper,
repeated for convenience in Figure 7 below. Our entry point is “Problem-Centered Initiation.”
With the problem defined, my research team has been and continues to be in the process of
iterating through the steps of that model, which is expected to continue well beyond the timeline of this dissertation. The research behind this dissertation, which has a strong emphasis on
the Demonstration and Evaluation phases of Peffers. This dissertation along with other
BluGen research already published (Llanso et al., 2017)(McNeil et al., 2018) represents the
Communication portion of the Peffer’s Design Science Research Methodology model.
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Figure 7: Peffers DSRM Process Model

Theory
As stated earlier, this dissertation centers on BluGen and its evaluation. The hypotheses in Table 3 underlie BluGen. See Figure 8 to place artifacts mentioned in the hypotheses
below into an architectural context. The dissertation focuses on hypotheses H1, H2, and H3.
The other hypotheses are out of scope and are only included to give the reader a sense of the
larger research agenda.
Table 3: BluGen Hypotheses
ID

Hypothesis Summary

H1

BluGen results are more repeatable and reproducible compared to manual, event-centric
methods.

H2

BluGen requires less analyst time compared to manual, event-centric methods.

H3

BluGen provides greater attack surface coverage compared to manual, event-centric methods.

H4

Exposure is positively correlated with probability of successful attack.

H5

The following BluGen artifacts have utility to the SA: overall BluGen instantiation, Exposure
method, Criticality method, and Mitigation method.

H6

Capability enumeration has utility.
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Artifact Design
In this section, we describe the BluGen artifact design. Figure 8 presents a high level
architectural view of BluGen. In summary, BluGen is designed as an assistant to the SA and
consists of a set of analytic processes and an underlying database called the Reference Catalog (RefCat). To analyze a system for risk and potential mitigations to help manage that risk,
the SA prepares a dataset called a "project" that captures essential details about the system to
be analyzed and parameters that drive its analysis for risk. The SA submits the project as input
to the BluGen software. BluGen analytics cross reference data in the project and RefCat to
prepare two major outputs: a risk scatter plot and a report of suggested mitigations (see Table
2 for examples of mitigations).

Figure 8: BluGen Architecture
BluGen consists of a number of artifacts, as summarized in Table 4. Below we discuss
each of the artifacts using a description adapted and updated from (Llanso et al., 2017).
Table 4: BluGen Artifacts
Artifact

Summary

Framework

BluGen itself

Models

Project and Reference Catalog (RefCat)

Methods

Exposure, Criticality, Mitigation Selection3

Instantiation

Java-based instantiation of the BluGen framework

3

Note that BluGen uses the term ‘analytic’ to refer to the Design Science concept of ‘method’.
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Framework
The BluGen framework is the conceptual structure for the capability-based approach
for assessing risk and recommending mitigations.

Models
BluGen models consist of the project model and the Reference Catalog model.

Project Model
The project model describes the target cyber environment to be assessed by BluGen
and contains three key sets: (1) M, a set of missions; (2) A, a set of assets; and (3) D, a set of
data types. The assets in A support the missions in M by processing data in D. Data is subject
to compromise possibilities in C, a set of fixed compromise possibilities discussed below. We
follow the convention that variables 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘, 𝑙 index objects from M, A, D, and C respectively,
under the following four constraints:
•

𝑚𝑖 ∈ 𝑀, 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ |𝑀|

•

𝑎𝑗 ∈ 𝐴, 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ |𝐴|

•

𝑑𝑘 ∈ 𝐷, 1 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ |𝐷|

•

𝑐𝑙 ∈ 𝐶, 1 ≤ 𝑙 ≤ |𝐶|

Each asset instance, 𝑎𝑗 ∈ 𝐴, consists of a name, an optional description, an asset type,
and a set of defensive capabilities that have already been mapped to the asset. The asset type
must map onto one of the asset types found in the RefCat model (discussed below). If a new
asset type is encountered that is not in the RefCat, it must be added and mapped accordingly.
For missions, the environment description includes the overall weight of each mission relative
to the other directly supported missions; weights are typically determined by mission and system experts working together. Mission weights should sum to 1.0 for a given Project model
instance.
The criticality component of the Project model consists of a set of "raw" criticality 4tuples. Each criticality 4-tuple, (𝑚𝑖, 𝑎𝑗 , 𝑑𝑘 , 𝑐𝑙 ), is a unique combination of four values: a given
mission, m, a given asset, a, a given mission data type, d, and a given compromise type, c,
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chosen from the set {𝐶𝑂, 𝐼𝑁, 𝐴𝑉} where 𝐶𝑂 represents a breach of confidentiality, 𝐼𝑁 represents a breach of integrity, and 𝐴𝑉 represents a breach of availability. Note that not every possible 4-tuple in the Cartesian product of 𝑀 × 𝐴 × 𝐷 × 𝐶 represents a viable combination, as
not every data type is associated with every asset, and not every asset is associated with every
mission. Thus, the Cartesian product is an upper bound for the number of tuples required.
Associated with each raw criticality 4-tuple is a score expressed in the range 0.0 to
1.0, with 0.0 meaning not mission-critical at all and 1.0 meaning maximal mission criticality,
the worst-case mission impact ("mission kill") if a cyber compromise were to occur in the
context defined by the triple. For example, one of many criticality triples for a robot might be:
(mission=navigate, asset=sensor, data=location, effect=integrity (IV)) and the worst-case impact for the 4-tuple might be found to be 1.0.
BluGen does not prescribe how raw criticality scores are derived; the scores could be
manually assigned by mission experts or they could be generated by a mission/cyber performance simulation that can induce simulated cyber effects and automatically determine related
mission impacts, e.g., (Llanso & Klatt, 2014). The former would typically provide scores
along an ordinal scale, while the latter would typically provide scores along a ratio scale
based on mission performance metrics. The latter is more desirable to help minimize potential
SA bias.

Reference Catalog (RefCat) Model
The purpose of the BluGen RefCat model is to capture peer-reviewed cyber- and cybersecurity-related knowledge and make it available for reuse. The BluGen software uses the
RefCat along with details about a given target mission/system environment to assess mission
risk due to cyber effects (e.g., malicious cyber attacks, human error, acts of nature) and to recommend related mitigations based on a stated threat and risk tolerance. In the realm of
knowledge management, the RefCat can be categorized as a knowledge sharing system (Alavi
& Leidner, 2001).
The RefCat is a machine-readable repository of cyber knowledge consisting of five
primary classes of objects, as follows: (1) a taxonomy of entity types, (2) a set of offensive ca-
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pabilities that threaten those entity types, (3) a set of defensive solutions that can mitigate offensive capabilities, (4) a set of defensive capabilities from which one composes defensive solutions, and (5) Relationships among the above items. In particular, relationships are many-tomany mappings between offensive capabilities and entity types, defensive solutions and offensive capabilities, and defensive capabilities to defensive solutions.
The RefCat structure is based in part on the model presented in the paper, "A Unified
Model for System Security Engineering" (Llanso & Engebretson, 2016). Figure 9 is a summary of the elements above, using a simplified version of Unified Modeling Language notation (Object Management Group, 1999).

Figure 9: Summary of the RefCat Model (UML)
A few notes on the figure are as follows: Entities can be missions, cyber-enabled assets, and data processed by assets on behalf of missions. Offensive capabilities threaten assets
in a many-to-many relationship. Defensive solutions can mitigate offensive capabilities. A defensive solution consists of a set of defensive capabilities mapped to a defensive solution or
mapped indirectly via defensive Groups. A defensive group specifies a set of defensive capabilities that are often used together. A defensive model (not shown, but present in the RefCat)
consists of a specific set of defensive capabilities that models a particular cyber adversary
(e.g., country X, organization Y) or a particular class of adversaries (e.g., Defense Science
Board (DSB) tier 3 (Gosler & Von Thaer, 2013)). The RefCat can have many defensive models that represent different subsets of the defensive capabilities recorded in the RefCat. A defensive model consists of a set of defensive solutions and their related defensive capabilities
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Methods
This section presents the three major BluGen methods: Exposure, Criticality, and Mitigation.

Exposure Method
In BluGen, we leverage the capability-based representation to define that an entity has
higher exposure to anticipated cyber threat actors if it is threatened by a greater number of offensive capabilities for which there are no corresponding set of mitigating defensive capabilities. The Exposure method computes this quantity as presented in Equation 1.
Equation 1: Exposure Method
𝐴𝐵

𝑆𝑟𝑐
𝑎
∑𝑂𝐶
(𝐷𝑆𝑜𝑐 . 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 ∙ 𝑑𝑐. 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 ∙ 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑑𝑐)))
𝑜𝑐 max(∀𝑑𝑠 ∈ 𝐷𝑆𝑟𝑐 ∑𝑎𝑏
∀𝑎 ∈ 𝐴, 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒(𝑎) =
|𝑂𝐶𝑎 |

Table 5 contains a legend of the symbols used in the exposure and criticality equations.
Table 5: Equation Symbols
Symbol

Meaning

M

Missions in the criticality input data (𝑚 ∈ 𝑀)

A

Assets in the criticality input data (𝑎 ∈ 𝐴)

D

Data types in the criticality input data (d ∈ 𝐷)

OCa

Offensive capabilities that threaten an asset type, a (oc ∈ 𝑂𝐶)

𝐷𝑆𝑜𝑐

Defensive solution to mitigate defensive capability oc

𝐴𝐵𝑜𝑐

Ability (either solution or defensive group)

present(dc)

1 if defensive capability is present for mitigating threat to a; else 0

𝑚𝑤(𝑚𝑖 )

Mission weight for the ith mission

𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡(𝑚𝑖 , 𝑎𝑗 , 𝑑𝑘 )

Mission criticality score for the given data (d) processed by the given asset (a)
on behalf of the given mission (m)

max(…)

Entity with the highest criticality

weight

Effectiveness of a given solution

As Equation 1 shows, the Exposure method considers each entity in the system, looking up its corresponding entity type in the RefCat. It then searches for all applicable offensive
capabilities that are mapped to assets of the given type. Next, for each offensive capability,
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the method seeks the "best" defensive solution available in the RefCat to mitigate the offensive capabilities, among potentially many solutions available. The best solution is identified
by scoring each candidate solution. This is done by summing up the products of the defensive
capabilities required for the solution that are present in the current system times the overall
solution effectiveness ('weight' in the equation). Lastly, the sum is divided by the number of
solutions available to yield a mean effectiveness, which is registered as the overall exposure
score for the entity. Figure 9 shows an abstracted example of the exposure analytic.

Figure 10: Exposure Analytic Example
In the example (Figure 10), the exposure analytic iterates through the Project model,
considering each asset instance in turn. For a given asset, the analytic looks up the corresponding asset in the reference catalog, finding Asset Type X. Next, it looks up the offensive
capabilities that threaten assets of that type, finding OC1, OC2, OC3. Then, for each offensive
capability, the analytic looks up the defensive solutions that are available to mitigate the offensive capabilities, finding DS1, DS2, DS3, and DS4. Next, the analytic looks up the defensive capabilities that contribute to each of the blue solutions, finding DC1-DC8. The analytic
then cross references each defensive capability to see if it is present in the Project model and
is mapped to the corresponding asset instance (meaning it is the identified defensive capability contributing to the mitigation of red capabilities that threaten such assets). The green check
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marks () indicate that the defensive capability-to-asset mapping exists, while the red X’s
() indicate the mapping is absent. The number on a mapping from a blue solution to an offensive capability represents an estimate of the effectiveness of the blue solution in mitigating
the corresponding offensive capability. The number on a mapping from a defensive capability
to the corresponding solution represents the weight of the capability’s contribution to the
overall solution. A number that is underlined means that the capability is required for the solution to be effective at all.
Figure 11 below shows the calculations for the exposure example discussed in Figure
10. The weight of each defensive capability is multiplied by the effectiveness of the overall
defensive solution to produce a score. The score is set to zero if any defensive capability required by the solution is missing in the Project model. Summing the scores for each blue solution for each offensive capability results in a coverage score for the blue solution. These are
highlighted in yellow in the figure. For each threat, one minus the coverage score produces
the exposure. The overall exposure for the asset is the arithmetic mean of the exposure scores
for each offensive capability (0.55 in this case).

Figure 11: Calculation for the Exposure Example
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Criticality Method
In BluGen, an entity is defined as mission-critical if a greater number of highly
weighted missions rely on the entity and a greater number of highly critical data types are processed there. The Criticality method computes this quantity as shown in Equation 2.
∀𝑒 ∈ 𝐸 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑒) =

|𝐷|
∑|𝑀|
𝑖=1 ∑𝑗=1 𝑚𝑤(𝑚𝑖 ) ∙ 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡(𝑒, 𝑚𝑖 , 𝑑𝑗 )

max(𝑟𝑐(𝑒))
Equation 2: Criticality Method

The criticality of a given asset is the sum of raw criticalities in the Environment that
are processed by that asset, scaled by the weights associated with the missions that depend on
the asset. The final criticality of an asset is expressed as a ratio of the highest criticality of any
asset in the target Environment, thus all Environments will have at least one asset with value
1.0. An abstracted example of the criticality analytic is given in Table 6.
Table 6: Criticality Analytic Example

Table 6 is mission criticality data from a target environment description provided as
part of the input project supplied to BluGen. In this simple example, there are four missions,
M1-M4, each with a corresponding mission weight. Mission weight indicates the relative importance of a given mission compared to other missions supported; BluGen expects the
weights sum to 1.0. The environment processes three data types, D1-D3, and the data for each
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mission is mapped to each of the four asset instances (A1-A4). Computing the overall criticality of each asset involves summing up the weighted criticality of each data type processed by
each asset for each mission, where such a mapping exists. The sum of the results is then computed, resulting in ‘raw criticality’ for each asset. The final overall asset criticality is simply
the ratio of each raw criticality to the highest raw criticality among the assets considered.
Thus, one asset will always have a criticality of 100% using this method (asset A3 in this example).

Mitigation Method
The Mitigation Method, which is a logical extension of the exposure method, recommends mitigations that are currently missing in the target Environment based on the anticipated threat. For each entity in the Environment, the mitigation method looks up the corresponding entity type in the RefCat. Then, for the given entity type, the mitigation method
looks up the offensive capabilities possessed by the anticipated adversary that threaten entities
of the given type. For each of the offensive capabilities identified, the mitigation method then
looks up candidate defensive solutions that map to the given defensive capability. Solutions
are assigned a given level of effectiveness, expressed as a percentage, with respect to a given
defensive capability. The mitigation method selects the most effective solution and reports a
list of the defensive capabilities associated with that solution that are not already implemented
in the target Environment.

Instantiation
We created an initial instantiation, Version 1.0, of the BluGen framework implemented in the Java programming language with file storage in Java Script Object Notation
(JSON) files. The JSON files contain the RefCat and the environmental/project data.

Exploring the Hypotheses
To test our hypotheses, we carried out a comparative study involving the risk analysis
of a ground system for a geosynchronous satellite. For ease of reference, we refer to the
ground system as “Omega.” The study evaluates the hypotheses by comparing analysis results
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from BluGen and a representative, manually scored event-centric method. We refer to the
event-centric method as EVRA, short for Event-based Risk Analysis4.

Description of Target System to be Analyzed
Working with a team of experts in aerospace systems engineering, we prepared a detailed description of a ground system that controls a geosynchronous satellite and its payloads.
Omega was created as part of an earlier research project. The overall mission of Omega is
Space Situational Awareness (SSA). The SSA mission has, in turn, two sub-missions: (1) optical sensing of objects in space and (2) communications of SSA data to various parties. To
keep the example openly publishable, the ground system design is a composite of many real
ground systems, but the description is not specific to any single ground system. An overview
of the ground system architecture appears in Figure 12. The ground system consists of many
interconnected cyber components, including controller workstations for the satellite itself and
each of the two satellite payloads. The payloads on-board are an optical sensor and a communications transponder. In addition to the hardware and software components identified in the
figure, the system also consists of a number of roles that people play to control the satellite
and its payload as part of carrying out the SSA mission. Examples of roles are the sensor
manager, communications manager, and satellite ops (operations) manager.

4

Analysts have applied EVRA in over twenty studies, covering both concept-level and fielded systems.

EVRA includes an automated tool that provides bookkeeping assistance when logging the manually-scored attacks. The tool also generates risk plots based on these scores.
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Figure 12: Ground System
Summary information about the architecture in Figure 12 is given in Table 7. As indicated, there are 994 unique entities and relationships in Omega.
Table 7: Entity/Relationship Counts in Omega
Entity/Relationship
Missions

Count
2

Cyber-related asset instances

33

Unique asset types

13

Data types

26

Asset-to-asset mappings (containment)

32

Asset-to-asset mappings (capability inheritance)

80

Data-to-asset mappings
Unique existing mitigations

283
38

Existing mitigations-to-asset mappings

204

Unique Mission-Data Type-Asset combinations

283

Total Entity Count

994
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Table 8 summarizes the two missions supported by the ground system shown in Figure 12. The information consists of three attributes: a unique identifier (ID column), the name
of the missions (Name column) and the relative importance assigned to each mission (Mission
Weight column). The relative importance of each mission is represented by a weight value,
0.0 ≤ weight ≤ 1.0, under the constraint that the relative mission weights must sum to 1.0. The
weighting information informs EVRA SAs and the BluGen criticality analytic of mission importance when determining the criticality of assets.
Table 8: Missions
ID

Name

Mission Weight

M1

Relay Comms Traffic between SSA Data Customers

0.6

M2

Provide Space Observations to SSA Data Customers

0.4

Figure 13 shows the portion of the RefCat asset type taxonomy relevant to Omega.

Figure 13: Subset of Asset Type Taxonomy Referenced by Omega
Table 9 augments Figure 13 to include four attributes: (1) a unique identifier (ID),
(2) the asset type name, (3) the description of the asset type, and (4) the ID of the parent asset
type (PID), if any, for the given asset type. Note that the asset type matches an existing asset
type in the asset type taxonomy in the RefCat.
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Table 9: Asset Types Descriptions
ID

Asset Type
Name

Summary Description

PID

(nil)

1

Asset

Anything that has value to an organization (other than missions and
data), including, but not limited to, another organization, person, computing device, information technology (IT) system, IT network, IT circuit, software (both an installed instance and a physical instance), virtual computing platform (common in cloud and virtualized computing), and related hardware (e.g., locks, cabinets, keyboards).
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Aggregate Asset

An asset that is a container for other assets.

1

5

Endpoint Device

A non-embedded device primarily for use by one user or a group of
users (e.g., workstation)

4

4

Computing
Device

A machine (real or virtual) for performing calculations automatically
(including, but not limited to, computer, servers, routers, switches,
etc.). The computing device must be IP addressable (or addressable
via an equivalent network protocol).

1
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Authentication
Mechanism

A combination of hardware and/or software designed to authenticate
passwords, tokens, biometric and/or other information to identify the
user of an account or other resource.

1

22

Link

A communications medium between two communicating computers,
without intermediary computing devices. Does not include the exposed interfaces on either end-point.

1

7

Network Device

A non-embedded computing device (other than cross domain solutions) that supports the interconnection of other devices via circuits to
form a network; and/or controls/limits the flow of information on that
network. As such, network devices are responsible for the layers 3
and/or 4 of the OSI Model.

4

23

Wired-Link

Includes all non-RF links

22

15

Role

All relevant roles that people play with respect to a given target system.

1

16

General User

Includes all persons with any role. The larger the size of this group
(and/or the degree to which their allowed access/behavior is less limited), the more likely that the group as a whole has moderate to high
impact.

15
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Non-High Assurance Device

A computing device that is not embedded hardware or high assurance

4
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ID

Asset Type
Name

Summary Description

PID

15

19

Non-IT Role

Includes persons in roles where the holders need training regarding
physical access, even though they do not access the IT network. This
could include cleaners, drivers and others who have information about
physical security controls, trash, or who might see information on a
whiteboard, desk, or printer. The role holder may be an employee,
contractor, a family member, or other confidant.

18

Security Admin Role

Includes persons in roles to perform cyber security related functions.
These roles are almost always of the highest impact, if compromised.

15

17

System Admin
Role

Includes persons in roles to perform system administrative functions
(apart from mission specific applications). These roles almost always
have high impact.

15

38

Physical Space

A campus, building, floor, suite, room, rack, vehicle, deck, etc. that
contains cyber assets.

1

34

Cryptographic
Mechanism

A combination or hardware and/or software designed to manage the
encryption/decryption of data and control who has the keys necessary
to perform these operations.

1
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Endpoint
Cryptographic
Mechanism

A cryptographic module, a key storage mechanism, and other parts
needed to implement a cryptographic mechanism (except key management) on a computing device

34

35

Key Management Mechanism

A part of a cryptographic module that distributes keys (e.g., directly or
through certificates) and limits access to appropriate accounts/person.

34

Table 10 shows the asset instances found in Omega. The table includes references to
the types of each asset instance. Asset types are shown above in Figure 13 and Table 9.
Table 10: Assets Instances and Their Types
ID
A01

Name
Ground Control Segment

Asset Type

ID

Name

Asset Type

Aggregate Asset

A18 Premise Router Link

Wired-Link

A02 Type 1 Link Crypto

Aggregate Asset

A19 Data Switch 1 Link

Wired-Link

A03 Admin Controller

Endpoint Device

A20 Comms Manager

General User

Endpoint Device

A21

Endpoint Device

A22 Sensor Manager

General User

Endpoint Device

A23 System Maintainer

Non-IT Roles

Computing Device

A24 Security Admin

Security Admin
Roles

A04

Comms Payload Controller

A05 Satellite Ops Controller
A06

Sensor Payload Controller

A07 Storage Server

Satellite Ops Manager

General User
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ID

Name

Asset Type

ID

Name

Asset Type

A08 Authentication Service

Authentication
Mechanism

A25 System Admin

System Admin
Roles

A09 Premise Router

Network Device

Ground Segment
A26 Physical Access
Control

Physical Space

Wired-Link

A27 Sat Ops Crypto

Endpoint Cryptographic Mech.

Wired-Link

A28 SSA Data Crypto

Endpoint Cryptographic Mech.

Network Device

A29 GEP Crypto

Endpoint Cryptographic Mech.

Wired-Link

A30 Data Switch 1

Network Device

Wired-Link

A31 Data Switch 2

Network Device

Wired-Link

Key/Certificate
A32
Management

Key Management Mechanism

A33 Storage Server Link

Wired-Link

A10

Ground Control-Ground
Entry Point Comms

A11 Network Link
A12

Ground Segment Network Switch

A13 Admin Controller Link
A14

Comms Payload Controller Link

Satellite Ops Controller
A15
Link
A16

Sensor Payload Controller Link

Wired-Link

A17

Authentication Service
Link

Wired-Link

Table 11 lists information about the twenty-six data types processed by assets in
Omega. The information consists of two attributes: a unique identifier (ID column) and the
names of the data types.
Table 11: Data Types
ID

Name

ID

Name

D01 Captured Observations

D14 Telemetry

D02 Comms Traffic

D15 Repository Data

D03 Processed Observation Data

D16 Spacecraft Operations Plan

D04 Space Vehicle Commands

D17 Tasking Information

D05 Time Slot Assignment

D18 Onboard Clock Adjustment

D06

Access Request for Flight Support Access
Node

D19 Telemetry and Command Archive Logs

D07 Communications Configuration Commands

D20 Telemetry Requests

D08 Customer Communications Requests

D21 Authentication Data
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ID

Name

ID

Name

D09 Customer Observation Requests

D22 Authorization Data

D10 Sensor Configuration Commands

D23 GEP Control Data

D11 Sensor Observation Schedule Commands

D24 Sat Ops Key Material

D12 Sensor Recalibration Commands

D25 Comms Traffic Key Material

D13 Calibration Data

D26 GEP Control Key Material

The tables above define the missions, asset instances, and data types in Omega. Next,
we illustrate various relationship mappings present in the ground system. Table 12 shows a
sampling of asset-to-asset mappings, of which there are two kinds: (1) aggregation mappings
to show which assets are “contained” within other assets and (2) inheritance relationships to
show which assets inherit capabilities associated with other assets.
Table 12: Mapping of Assets to Assets (sampling)
Asset 1

Asset 2

Relationship Type

A01

A02

Contains

A01

A03

Contains

A01

A04

Contains

A02

A27

Contains

A02

A28

Contains

A02

A29

Contains

A03

A08

Inherits Capabilities From

A03

A09

Inherits Capabilities From

A03

A24

Inherits Capabilities From

Table 13 shows a sampling of mappings between data types and assets. In particular,
the rows in the table show which assets process the “Captured Observations” data type.
Table 13: Mapping of Data Types to Assets
Data Type

Asset

Captured Observations

Sensor Payload Controller

Captured Observations

Storage Server

Captured Observations

Ground Control-Ground Entry Point Comms

Captured Observations

Ground Segment Network Switch

Captured Observations

Sensor Payload Controller Link
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Data Type

Asset

Captured Observations

Data Switch 1 Link

Captured Observations

Sensor Manager

Captured Observations

Storage Server Link

Table 14 shows a sampling of mappings from mitigations to assets. Such mappings indicate to BluGen that a given asset benefits from the corresponding mitigation.
Table 14: Mapping of Mitigations to Assets
Mitigation

Asset

Authenticate All Accounts

Authentication Service

Detect and respond (D&R) to moderately-sophisticated techniques in
social settings

Comms Manager

Detect and respond (D&R) to moderately-sophisticated techniques in
social settings

Satellite Ops Manager

Detect and respond (D&R) to moderately-sophisticated techniques in
social settings

Security Admin

Detect and Respond to Authentication Attacks

Authentication Service

Detect and Respond to comprehensive attacks on Weak Commercial
Crypto, Keys managed/stored with Commercial Tools

GEP Crypto

Table 15 shows a sampling of mappings in which a given data type is processed by a
given asset in the process of supporting a given mission. For each mapping, mission criticality
scores are given for three different situations: (1) a breach of data confidentiality (C column),
a breach of data integrity (I column), and a breach of availability (A column). For Omega, a
SA manually assigned the scores based on his knowledge of the missions and how the underlying system supports those missions. In general, mission experts provide a written rationale
for their mission criticality scores; due to space considerations, we omitted this information.
Table 15: Mission Criticality Mappings
Data Type

Asset

Mission

C

I

A

Comms Traffic

Comms Payload Controller

Relay Comms Traffic between SSA Data Customers

0.7 0.6 0.6

Comms Traffic

Ground Control-Ground
Entry Point Comms

Relay Comms Traffic between SSA Data Customers

0.7 0.6 0.6

Comms Traffic

Ground Segment Network Switch

Relay Comms Traffic between SSA Data Customers

0.7 0.6 0.6
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Data Type

Asset

Mission

C

I

A

Comms Traffic

Comms Payload Controller Link

Relay Comms Traffic between SSA Data Customers

0.7 0.6 0.6

Comms Traffic

Data Switch 1 Link

Relay Comms Traffic between SSA Data Customers

0.7 0.6 0.6

Comms Traffic

Comms Manager

Relay Comms Traffic between SSA Data Customers

0.7 0.6 0.6

Comms Traffic

SSA Data Crypto

Relay Comms Traffic between SSA Data Customers

0.7 0.6 0.6

Comms Traffic

Data Switch 1

Relay Comms Traffic between SSA Data Customers

0.7 0.6 0.6

Comms Traffic

Data Switch 2

Relay Comms Traffic between SSA Data Customers

0.7 0.6 0.6

Space Vehicle Commands Satellite Ops Controller

Relay Comms Traffic between SSA Data Customers

0.4 0.8 0.8

Space Vehicle Commands

Ground Control-Ground
Entry Point Comms

Relay Comms Traffic between SSA Data Customers

0.4 1.0 1.0

Space Vehicle Commands

Ground Segment Network Switch

Relay Comms Traffic between SSA Data Customers

0.4 0.8 0.8

Space Vehicle Commands

Satellite Ops Controller
Link

Relay Comms Traffic between SSA Data Customers

0.4 0.8 0.8
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Hypotheses Expectations
Below, we discuss what we expect to find with each of the three hypotheses.

H1 Expectations
We argue that H1 (“BluGen results are more repeatable and reproducible compared to
manual, event-centric methods”) is supported with the following justification: Given that
BluGen executes a deterministic set of analytics (methods), BluGen will, by definition, produce the same outputs given the same inputs, a result that is independent of the security architect (SA) using BluGen. Thus, we argue for repeatability (the same SA using BluGen at different times but with the same inputs will obtain the same outputs) and reproducibility
(BluGen will produce the same outputs given the same inputs regardless of which SA submits
the inputs). The utility of this hypothesis is with respect to comparison to manual analysis,
where human rater variability tends to be a significant issue. Reliability issues tied to human
raters was discussed in the literature review, including concerns about the use of human raters
in cyber-related risk assessment (Hallberg et al., 2017). Given the foregoing explanation and
justification, we consider that H1 has support and will not discuss it further.

H2 Expectations
Our expectation for H2 (“BluGen requires less analyst time compared to manual,
event-centric methods”) is that automated analysis of the type performed by BluGen will execute in a short amount of time (seconds to minutes) compared to the time required to perform
similar analysis manually, which experience has shown can take from tens to hundreds of
hours depending on target system size and complexity. Thus, BluGen total analysis time is expected to be far shorter than EVRA analysis time when analyzing the same target system.
This result would support H2.

H3 Expectations
Our expectation for H3 (“BluGen provides greater attack surface coverage compared
to manual, event-centric methods “) is that, on average, BluGen provides greater attack surface coverage than manual event-centric methods. The reasoning is as follows. In EVRA, SAs
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generally proceed node-by-node5 in the target system and manually assign a score for the estimated level-of-effort (LOE) required to successfully attack the node. The process of assigning
scores is usually based on a team of around three SAs discussing what they know about the
nature of each node in question (e.g., its vulnerabilities) and assigning a final score by consensus. In the author’s experience witnessing manual scoring sessions tied to different risk methodologies, while SAs may write down a brief rationale for each score they assign, they are not
always rigorous during this process. For example, whether due to resource constraints, fatigue, or other reasons, SAs do not always consult and systematically cross reference external
sources of information (e.g., threat models, asset taxonomies, vulnerability databases, security
control libraries, mappings between these). Given the complexity of modern cyber systems,
coupled with the often informal and ad hoc nature of this SA-driven scoring process, we argue
that gaps in analyzing the attack surface in terms of threat capabilities are almost certain to
occur.
To contrast with the manual process described above, approaches like BluGen automatically consider every possible threat capability known to be possessed by the anticipated
threat actor that is mapped to each of the assets that make up a given node. Of course, BluGen
is limited to whatever knowledge is currently stored in its RefCat. However, the RefCat is expected to grow in size and accuracy over time, as additional content is added and as peer review and empirical validation of its content proceeds.

Comparative Study Details
As mentioned earlier, we undertook a comparative study to explore the hypotheses.
Below we lay out a framework for examining the hypotheses for the comparative study. Next,
we discuss the state of BluGen software tool and reference catalog used in the study. We then
describe the teams that carried out the respective BluGen and EVRA analyses. Finally, we describe in detail the data submitted as input to each analysis.

5

A node is a computer-type asset in EVRA parlance.
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Framework for Examining the Hypotheses
As discussed earlier, hypothesis H1 is considered to be supported and is not examined
further. Hypotheses H2 and H3 are fundamentally about comparisons of BluGen to the representative manual, event-centric methodology, EVRA.
Whether using BluGen, EVRA, or some other cyber risk methodology, the high-level
steps are generally the same. A brief description of those steps appears in Table 16. Our research examined steps 3, 4, and 5 in the table with respect to hypotheses H2 and H3. The remaining steps (1, 2, and 6) were not considered because the data related to those steps is the
same for both analysis methods and is thus considered a constant. The data for steps 1 and 2,
in particular, were given identically as input for both the BluGen and EVRA methodologies.
Table 16: Major Cyber Risk Methodology Assessment Steps
Major Assessment
Steps

Brief Description

1. Collect and
load data

Collect and load data on the anticipated threat, description of the target system,
missions supported by the system, and information about risk tolerance.

2. Score mission
criticality

Score the mission impact if cyber-related effects (e.g., malicious attacks) occur
in the context of every viable combination of mission, asset, and data.

3. Prepare “before” risk plot

Score attack level of effort (EVRA) or exposure (BluGen) for the corresponding attack (EVRA) or asset (BluGen) for the target system as presented.

4. Analyze
mitigations

Analyze which potential mitigations might help lower risk to a more acceptable level.

5. Prepare “after” risk plot

Score attack level of effort (EVRA) or exposure (BluGen) for the corresponding attack (EVRA) or asset (BluGen) based on the assumed presence of the
mitigations identified in step 4.

6. Prepare and
brief report

Prepare a report and associated briefing package of the risk assessment results
and associated recommendations to be briefed to appropriate stakeholders.

Table 17 identifies the variables associated with H2 and H3 for assessment steps 3, 4,
and 5. The variables for H3 cut across the three assessment steps.
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Table 17: Assessment Steps Examined and Their Associated Variables
Hypotheses and Associated Variables for Data Capture
(variables tracked separate for BluGen and EVRA)
Major Assessment
Steps

H2:
Time

3. Prepare before
risk plot

𝑇𝑃𝐵 - Time to prepare before plot

4. Analyze mitigations

𝑇𝐴𝑀 - Time to analyze mitigations

5. Prepare after
risk plot

𝑇PA - Time to prepare after plot

H3:
Coverage
𝐶𝐴𝑇 - Asset types count
𝐶𝑂𝐶 - Offensive capability count
𝐶𝐷𝑆 - Defensive solutions count
𝐶𝐷𝐶 - Defensive capabilities count
𝐶𝑀 - Count of mappings

Analyzing H2 Data. As the variables in Table 17 imply, to evaluate H2, we tracked
the time required by SAs to carry out the analysis for steps 3, 4, and 5 for each approach
(BluGen, EVRA). Tracking was done via spreadsheets and a time reporting system. In addition, we extrapolated the time values into the future to address the need for reassessment of
the target system. Reassessment is necessary for nearly all systems, as threat, mission, and
system all tend to evolve with time, thus limiting the shelf life of earlier assessments.
Analyzing H3 Data. To evaluate H3, we performed a (1) comparison of the H3
counts captured in the table (asset types, offensive and defensive capabilities, mitigations,
mappings) and a (2) qualitative comparison of the same data. In both cases, we note and discuss differences. We do these steps separately for BluGen and EVRA. The qualitative comparison considers the relative nature and quality of the data, with special attention paid to potential gaps. As with H2, we discuss future coverage potential based on an evolving RefCat.
Approach is Not Statistical in Nature. As discussed in the dissertation proposal, the
quantitative analysis associated with the comparative study that we pursued is not statistical in
nature, as one would pursue in formal hypothesis testing. This is because the sample size required to achieve a reasonable margin of error is, for the dissertation, impracticable both in
terms our ability to recruit enough qualified SA teams to participate and in funding those SA
teams for the time required to execute EVRA studies. For a realistic test, we would need at
least three SMEs per EVRA study, and the study lead would need to be experienced in conducting at least one prior EVRA study. In addition, we note that Hallberg (Hallberg et al.,
2017) already considered scoring variability in risk assessments at the level of individual
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raters. Thus, rather than attempting to achieve a statistical result, our analysis is instead a
combination of the quantitative aspects (time and count differences between BluGen and
EVRA) and the qualitative aspects of the analysis, which examines the differences between
the two approaches in the context of the hypotheses examined.

State of BluGen Tool and RefCat
We used version 1.0 of the BluGen software and a snapshot of the RefCat as it existed
on June 30, 2017. The state of the BluGen RefCat model used in the comparative study is
summarized in Figure 14, which is a screen shot from the BluGen software tool.

Figure 14: Overall Counts in RefCat
The report shown in Figure 14 does not include relationships between capabilities,
which numbered 558, and relationships between capabilities and asset types, which numbered
85. Thus, the total number of entities in the Version 1.0 RefCat is 1,048.
Note that both the BluGen software and RefCat continued to be updated iteratively after the Version 1.0 release used for this study.
Hardware Platform for Running BluGen. We ran the BluGen software on a Dell
Latitude model E5770 laptop with an Intel Core I7-6820HQ CPU running at 2.7 GHz with 16
GB of main memory and 512 GB of hard disk. On this machine, BluGen was installed as an
application on the Windows 7 operating system from Microsoft.
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BluGen and EVRA Team Summaries
As the BluGen software conducts the risk assessment and mitigation analysis on a target system automatically, there was no BluGen “team,” per se. The BluGen operator simply
instructs the software tool to execute the risk plot generation step and then the mitigations report generation step. As discussed earlier, because we were using BluGen version 1.0, the
software lacks the feature to allow the user to check off the desired recommended mitigations
based on risk, which is needed to produce the “after” risk plot (the plot produced after accepted mitigations are assumed to be present). A BluGen RefCat developer and a BluGen
software developer worked to edit and then reimport the mitigation list. This feature will be
automated in BluGen 2.0.
EVRA depends vitally on SMEs for conducting steps such as attack scoring and mitigation determination that BluGen performs automatically. We recruited two separate teams to
execute the EVRA methodology for Omega, with the second team acting as a backup to the
first team in case the first team was unable to complete the EVRA assessment (e.g., due to
personnel availability issues).6 We used the results from team one to examine H2 and H3.
The personnel makeup of both EVRA teams is given in Table 18.
Table 18: Teams That Executed EVRA
Team

1

2

6

Highest Degree(s)

Total Experience

BS, Computer Science

6 yrs., 4 mo.

BS, Physics

3 yrs., 2 mo.

MS, Info. Technology

0 yrs., 3 mo.

MS, Computer Science

6 yrs., 9 mo.

MS, Computer Science

3 yrs., 5 mo.

BS, Math; BS, CS

0 yrs., 3 mo.

Having a second team also allowed us to gather anecdotal data concerning the reproducibility aspect

of hypothesis H1. We note that the level of scoring consistency between the two teams was poor, with the teams
producing different scores for the same attack context greater than 80% of the time.
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Inputs to BluGen and EVRA
This section defines inputs to BluGen and EVRA. These inputs are identical except in
those cases where there are different input needs between BluGen and EVRA (e.g., the way in
which risk tolerance values are described).
Assumed Threat. For our analysis of Omega, we assumed a Tier VI adversary, as defined by the Defense Science Board (DSB) report titled “TASK FORCE REPORT: Resilient
Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat” (Gosler & Von Thaer, 2013). Table 19,
taken from page 22 and 23 of the report provide brief overview descriptions of the capabilities
of the population of threat actors, which can be nation-states, organizations, or individuals, divided among six different tiers.
Table 19: DSB Threat Tier Definitions (Gosler & Von Thaer, 2013)
Tier
I

II

Description
Practitioners who rely on others to develop the malicious code, delivery mechanisms, and
execution strategy (use known exploits).
Practitioners with a greater depth of experience, with the ability to develop their own tools
(from publicly known vulnerabilities).
Practitioners who focus on the discovery and use of unknown malicious code, are adept at
installing user and kernel mode root kits10, frequently use data mining tools, target corpo-

III

rate executives and key users (government and industry) for the purpose of stealing personal and corporate data with the expressed purpose of selling the information to other
criminal elements.

IV

Criminal or state actors who are organized, highly technical, proficient, well-funded professionals working in teams to discover new vulnerabilities and develop exploits.
State actors who create vulnerabilities through an active program to “influence” commercial

V

products and services during design, development or manufacturing, or with the ability to
impact products while in the supply chain to enable exploitation of networks and systems of
interest.
States with the ability to successfully execute full spectrum (cyber capabilities in combina-

VI

tion with all of their military and intelligence capabilities) operations to achieve a specific
outcome in political, military, economic, etc. domains and apply at scale.
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Referring to the table, Tier I is the least capable threat actor, and tier VI is the most capable. The key assumption underlying the table is that an actor at a given tier n (n > I) possesses the capabilities at the given tier along with all of the capabilities of actors at lower tiers
(tiers I through n-1). Thus, for example, a tier III actor possesses the capabilities defined by
the union of capabilities across tiers I, II and III. Our assumption of a tier VI threat actor follows from our assertion and that of others (Bateman, 2017) that the most capable nation-states
could reasonably have an interest in using cyber as a means to disrupt a system like Omega.
While the DSB report (Gosler & Von Thaer, 2013) defines threat tiers, the tier definitions are defined at too high a level for BluGen analytics or EVRA SAs to conduct their analysis. Both require definition of specific attacker capabilities within each tier. Therefore, to
supplement the tier definitions, the BluGen RefCat incorporates a capability definition model
that defines capabilities by tier and by category. The model employs seven categories:
•

Ability to access networks

•

Ability discover and exploit vulnerabilities

•

Ability to defeat cryptography and authentication

•

Ability affect cyber/physical systems

•

Ability to gain physical access

•

Sophistication of cyber command and control

•

Sophistication of human influence

As an example of a capability, the following is defined for a tier I threat actor in the
category called “Ability to defeat cryptography and authentication.” The capability is: “Defeats weak commercial cryptography and weak passwords.” The EVRA SA team was given
access to the capability model based on the DSB tiers.
In addition to the threat model mentioned above, EVRA SAs and BluGen RefCat SAs
were given the freedom to consider additional capabilities not currently present in the DSB
threat capability model.
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System. The system description consists of an inventory of assets, including hardware,
software, and people (role) assets. For BluGen, we mapped assets instances to their corresponding types in the BluGen RefCat. The description also includes mitigations (defensive capabilities) and various mappings:
•

Connectivity: which assets connect to other assets via communications links

•

Containment: which assets contain other assets

•

Mitigation: which defensive capabilities map to which assets

Other inputs include the following:
•

Mission Criticality: Mission criticality data, as defined earlier in the section
Project Model.

•

Risk Tolerance: Risk tolerance specifications, which instruct EVRA SAs and
the BluGen software as to which assets (BluGen) or attacks (EVRA) are inscope for active mitigation considerations. Risk tolerance is defined by two
variables, as follows:
o Mission Criticality. The mission criticality value on the risk plot above
which mitigations are to be considered. For BluGen, mission criticality
is on a scale from 0.0 (no mission impact) to 1.0 (complete mission
failure). EVRA uses an analogous ordinal scale from 1 to 5.
o Likelihood of Impact. In BluGen, likelihood is estimated via a metric
called Exposure, measured on a scale from 0.0 (no unmitigated exposure to the relevant threat capabilities of the anticipated adversary) to
1.0 (full exposure to the relevant threat capabilities of the anticipated
adversary). The analogous measure in EVRA is Level of Capability,
which is an ordinal scale integer from 1 to 6 to identify the DSB threat
tier of the worst-case adversary that possesses the ability to carry out
the associated attack event.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
This chapter presents the results of the comparative study described in Chapter 3. We
begin with a summary of the results for BluGen and EVRA, followed by more detailed results
for each. Lastly, we discuss the results in the context of hypotheses H2 and H3.

Summary Results for BluGen and EVRA
Table 20 presents summary results data for BluGen and EVRA for variables defined
for hypotheses H2 and H3 in Table 17. Values in the BluGen column for H3 were tabulated
from a run of BluGen against Omega, the output of which is summarized in Figure 28 on page
79. We extracted values in the EVRA column from artifacts produced by the EVRA team. See
page 87 under the section heading “Omega Data Capture and Timekeeping Data”.
Table 20: Summary Data for Hypotheses H2 and H3
Area

H2
(Time)

Variable

BluGen

EVRA

𝑇𝑃𝐵 - Time to prepare before plot

<1 sec.

14.30 hrs.

𝑇𝐴𝑀 - Time to analyze mitigations

<1 sec.

5.25 hrs.

𝑇PA - Time to prepare after plot

12 hrs.

5.40 hrs.

~12 hrs.

24.95 hrs.

Totals
𝐶𝐴𝑇 - Asset types count

13

11

𝐶𝑂𝐶 - Offensive capability count

48

32

CDS - Defensive solution count

86

N/A

𝐶𝐷𝐶 - Defensive capabilities count

47

16

OffCap→Asset Type

129

45

DefCap→OffCap

303

N/A

DefCap→DefSolution

383

N/A

DefCap→Asset Type

N/A

16

𝑪𝑴 Total

815

61

1,009

120

H3
(Coverage)
𝐶𝑀 - Count of mappings

Totals

48
The abbreviations in the mappings portion of the table are: OffCap—Offensive capabilities, DefCap—Defensive Capabilities, and DefSolution—Defensive Solutions. The source
of data for the BluGen data is
Table 21 documents key assumptions and characteristics of the Omega analysis, as
conducted via BluGen and EVRA. We note that the way in which SAs actually apply EVRA
tends to vary from team to team, driven in part by time/funds available and the personality of
the team (e.g., whether the team has the patience and endurance to conduct very detailed analysis).
Table 21: Assumptions / Characteristics of the Analyses
#

Assumptions / Characteristics

BluGen

EVRA

1

Considered data types during risk scoring

Yes

No

2

Referred to an explicit threat model

Yes

Yes

3

Maximum assumed threat

Tier VI

Tier VI

4

Mapping of offensive capabilities to asset types

Explicit

Implicit

5

Mapping of defensive capabilities to offensive capabilities

Explicit

Implicit

6

Defensive capability course (RefCat =explicit, SA=implicit)

Explicit

Implicit

7

Analysis includes consideration of different user roles

Yes

No

8

SAs scored EVRA Transit Level of Capability (LOC)

N/A

No

9

Starting nodes (assets) selected in analysis

N/A

All nodes
(computers)

N/A

Yes

10 Attack vectors explicitly considered

Explanatory notes on Table 21 are given in Table 22. Values in the # column of Table
22 map back to the corresponding numbered row in Table 20.
Table 22: Explanatory Notes for Table 21
#

Notes

1

The BluGen criticality analytic consults data type information when rolling up criticality
scores for 3-tuples of (mission, asset, data-type). Some EVRA teams look at all combinations of mission/asset/data. The team was unable to consider this data due to limited project
scope.

2

One advantage that the EVRA team had that teams in the past have generally not had is that
we gave the team a copy of a capability-based threat model to work from for LOC scoring.
The BluGen threat model in the RefCat is a superset of this model.
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#
3

Notes
The DSB Tier VI (Gosler & Von Thaer, 2013) worst-case adversary was used for both
BluGen and EVRA.

The use of the term “Implicit” means that the corresponding information came from the
heads of the SAs themselves and informal discussions that they had with one another; the
4/5/6 consensus results of those discussions were summarized in informal rationale comments recorded by the SA team. The use of the term “Explicit” means that the corresponding information was explicitly recorded in the BluGen RefCat.
7

For time saving reasons, this particular EVRA team chose to ignore multiple user roles and
considered one administrative role only.

8

For time saving reasons, this particular EVRA team chose not to explicitly score “transit”
LOCs just using target LOCs in their place.

9

The EVRA team considered all nodes in the system as possible starting nodes for attacks.
Other EVRA teams sometimes pick just a subset of nodes for this purpose, usually for time
savings reasons.

10

Attack vectors (e.g., supply chain, over the network, physical access) are an aspect of offensive capabilities in the BluGen RefCat. In EVRA, SAs have the option of considering them
or not as part of the definition of an attack context.

BluGen-Specific Results
We present the BluGen analysis in this section, beginning with screenshots of the
BluGen tool after it has been run against the Omega example. The “before” risk plot (meaning
before any new mitigations are assumed to be applied) appears in Figure 15. The pink shaded
region in the upper right-hand portion of the figure is the region of unacceptable risk, which
the SA specifies by two input parameters shown at the bottom of the figure: Criticality and
Exposure, set in this case to the values 0.50 and 0.25, respectively. These figures taken together mean that any asset instance that has both a criticality score of at least 0.50 and an exposure score of at least 0.25 must be mitigated. The SA considers the risk to the missions
from cyber attacks against those assets to be unacceptable. Note that the legend for the assets
shown was not fully implemented in this version of BluGen (distinct assets types are supposed to have their own unique icon).
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Figure 15: BluGen “Before” Risk Plot
Figure 16 provides a screen shot of the BluGen interactive mitigations report; note the
scroll bar on the right. The report extends many pages.

Figure 16: Mitigations Report
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The report has one row per asset. The criticality and exposure scores for each asset
are shown, with values that exceed the corresponding risk tolerance parameter indicated in
red. For each asset, the report shows the red (offensive) capabilities that threaten assets of the
corresponding type and the “best” blue (defensive) solution available to mitigate the threat.
Also shown are the blue capabilities that make up each solution along with a checkmark that
indicates whether the mitigation is currently present or not in the target system.
As mentioned earlier, version 1.0 of the BluGen software does not support the feature,
planned for version 2.0, by which a user may selectively choose the mitigations that BluGen
recommends for a given target system, threat, and risk tolerance level and instruct the tool to
incorporate those mitigations into the model as though they are in place. This feature allows
the SA to easily one or more “after” risk plots, show risk under a given set of mitigations. As
version 1.0 of the software lacks this feature, the BluGen team manually entered the updated
mitigations into the project model and then re-ran the mitigations report. As this was the first
time the team had done this, some consultation was required, which took approximately 12
hours total to cover discussions on the best approach, execute the required query, do the manual editing of the mitigations import file, and reimport the file into a revised project.
More information on BluGen data for Omega can be found in Appendix A - Additional Information on BluGen. The appendix includes screen shots and discussion of the
BluGen software tool itself as well as special software written to extract the actual coverage
data processed by the tool during Omega analysis.

EVRA-Specific Results
We present the EVRA analysis in this section. After the SA’s completed their LOC
scoring, they entered those scores along with mission impact scores into the tool so that it
could conduct path analysis and generate the risk plot. During path analysis, the software
looks at each path from a given starting node in the architecture to a given target node in the
architecture, scoring the paths in terms of the SA-provide scores on the LOC for each node
along each path. The EVRA tool has no understanding of mitigations, and so does not recommend them, a major difference with BluGen. Instead, the SA’s meet and manually rescore
based on mitigations that they devise.
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Figure 17 shows the risk plot generated by the EVRA software tool. The number
shown by each circle in the plot represents the number of attack contexts that had the same
mission impact and LOC scores. The size of the circle is proportional to the number of attack
possibilities. The LOC scale is tied to the DSB levels and is thus inverted, so that high-impact, low-capability attacks cluster in the upper right-hand portion of the figure. Color coding
emphasis the seriousness of the attacks, with red being the most “risky”.

Figure 17: EVRA Risk Plot
More information on EVRA itself as well as Omega scoring artifacts and timekeeping
data can be found in Appendix B - Additional Information on EVRA.
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Discussion
This section discusses the results in the context of hypotheses H2 and H3. For ease of
reference, we repeat the wording of hypotheses H2 and H3 here:
•

H2: BluGen requires less analyst time compared to manual, event-centric methods

•

H3: BluGen provides greater attack surface coverage compared to manual, event-centric methods.

Hypothesis H2
In the case of BluGen, we found that the three time-related variables, TBP, TAM, and
TPA, all took less than one second to execute on the Dell Latitude laptop described earlier. As
discussed in the section above, however, BluGen version 1.0 required manual reentry of the
mitigation specifications before running the second risk plot, an activity that took 12 hours. In
the upcoming 2.0 version of BluGen, this feature will be built into the software, and the user
will simply check off the desired mitigations to be incorporated in automated reanalysis.
Nonetheless, even considering the time required to manually edit and reimport the external
project file, the total time (TBP + TAM + TPA) for the BluGen risk assessment of Omega was
still less than half the time required to accomplish the same task by the EVRA team (12 hours
vs. 24.95 hours, respectively). In BluGen version 2.0, the time should drop considerably,
equating to the time that the SA takes to check a series of boxes indicating whether or not to
accept proposed mitigations, which we anticipate to be on the order of a few minutes7. Thus,
we anticipate support for H2 will grow as further automation comes to BluGen in version 2.0.
In consideration of the total time values, we find support for H2.
The total time for an EVRA type analysis is actually magnified by the fact that target
systems need to be reevaluated at intervals, such as annually. Reevaluation is needed because
the nature of the cyber threat, the mission(s) that a target system supports, and the target system itself, all co-evolve in time, thus limiting the shelf life of any given risk analysis result.

7

This time excludes the time the SA takes to think through implications of selecting different mitiga-

tions, which arises whether BluGen, EVRA, or any other risk method is being used.
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Ultimately, a desire to assess risk in ‘real time’ makes the time required to conduct EVRAstyle manual analysis untenable.

Hypothesis H3
For H3, the total coverage for BluGen amounted to 1,009 distinct entities vs. 120 for
EVRA. Those figures represent totals for the variables CAT, COC, CDC, and CM, per Table 20.
Stated another way, EVRA SAs only considered approximately 12% of the entities compared
to BluGen. In consideration of the total coverage values, we find support for H3.
The H3 data for BluGen reflects the state of the RefCat at the time the comparative
study was executed. However, as a knowledge repository, RefCat is intended to be under continuous evolution as new cyber asset types are introduced, new offensive capabilities are identified, and new defensive solutions to mitigate the offensive capabilities are designed. In fact,
as of this writing (February 2018), the RefCat has grown to 8,953 entities, which is 8.5 times
larger than Version 1.0 RefCat used during this dissertation (current as of Summer 2017),
which was 1,048 entities. As catalogs such as the RefCat grow in time, the percentage of their
content that SAs can reasonably expect to retain “in their heads” so that they can conduct
manual risk scoring as they do today is expected to continue dropping. Thus, over the long
term, we believe that support for H3 will continue to grow.
In addition to a far richer RefCat, RefCat data quality is expected to improve over
time as its contents undergo further peer review and empirical data validation. The idea behind this is that the eventual goal for the RefCat is to host it on servers accessible to the cybersecurity community at large. In this setting, the RefCat will be available not only for reuse but
also for peer review of its contents. It is our expectation that data quality will improve through
the peer review process, much as academic paper quality can improve when authors take independent reviewer comments into consideration when updating their papers. A level beyond
peer review is taking into consideration empirical data from the “real world” cyber environment (e.g., the results of cyber incident response and forensic investigations) and cross referencing that data with data in the RefCat. Assertions in the RefCat can then be squared against
the empirical data, acting as another form of quality control. For example, incident data from
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sensors in major government agencies collected over several months might reveal that the effectiveness of a certain defensive solution recorded in the RefCat is actually lower than the
SA-set effectiveness score for the solution in the RefCat (e.g., the effectiveness score might
indicate 80% effective, but a large volume of incident data might reveal that the solution is effective only 40% of the time).

Validities
In this section, we consider the validity of the research described above. Valid research is, per Trochim, et al., “the best available approximation to the truth of a given proposition, inference, or conclusion” (Trochim & Donnelly, 2008).

Effort to Create the RefCat and RefCat Sharing with EVRA Team
Before reviewing specific kinds of validities, we first take up a possible point of objection in the manner by which BluGen and EVRA are compared. Specifically, one could argue
that while EVRA is a manual method, so too, indirectly, is BluGen, in the sense that the
BluGen RefCat is, at least initially, a product of manual (SA) effort. Therefore, an ostensibly
fairer comparison of BluGen and EVRA for the time element explored in H2 would have to
include the time in BluGen required to manually create the RefCat. Likewise, a seemingly
fairer comparison with respect to H3 would involve providing the BluGen RefCat to the SAs
for their own reference while executing EVRA. We argue, however, that these concerns are
misplaced.
With respect to H2, it is certainly true that the RefCat took time to initially create, and
it will likewise take time to maintain and extend the catalog into the future. That said, we expect that this effort will be amortized over hundreds to thousands of automated BluGen analyses that otherwise would have had to have been conducted manually otherwise. In this way,
BluGen and its RefCat act as force multipliers.
With respect to H3, while one could provide a copy of the RefCat to SAs as an aid to
conduct manual scoring, the goal of BluGen is to replace the need for manual scoring and to
provide a means to mitigate the issues that tend to go along with it (reference the prior discussion on this topic and work by Hallberg (Hallberg et al., 2017)). In addition, EVRA represents
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current practice. We did not want to distort current practice in the context of examining our
hypotheses.

Face Validity
A weak form of validity is Face Validity, the extent to which a construct or artifact
like BluGen makes sense to others “on the face of it.” (Trochim & Donnelly, 2008). We argue
for face validity for BluGen in terms of the reactions we have repeatedly experienced when
presenting core BluGen concepts to others in the cyber field, specifically, its capability-based
nature, its focus on assets, and its particular depiction of risk, including the concept of threat
exposure8. The approach appears to readily appeal to the intuition of others who are experienced in the cyber risk assessment field.

Instantiation Validity
Lukyanenko, et al. (Lukyanenko, Evermann, & Parsons, 2014) introduced the concept
of Instantiation Validity for Design Science Research, which they define as “the extent to
which an artifact is a valid instantiation of a theoretical construct or a manifestation of a design principle.” They further state that “Instantiation validity is analogous to the concept ... of
construct validity in survey research.”
We argue for instantiation validity in the sense that the instantiation of BluGen, and in
particular, the implementation of the Exposure, Criticality, and Mitigation methods were
painstakingly hand-checked by the research team in February and March 2017 against the abstract expression of those methods (equations and corresponding pseudo code). Thus, we have
confidence that the instantiation reflects those design concepts.

8

Since 2016, we have briefed BluGen to a variety of audiences, including HICSS (conference paper), a

risk assessment workshop at APL, the International Test Evaluation Association, the US Space Community, and
various departments and agencies of the US government.
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External Validity
External validity considers whether the results we obtain from our comparative study
generalize to other contexts. Below, we discuss the following threats to external validity:
•

The target system does not generalize to other system types

•

Time results related to h2 do not generalize to larger systems

•

EVRA does not generalize to other risk assessment methods

•

EVRA team does not generalize to other teams

Threat: Target system does not generalize to other system types. We conducted
our comparative study against a single target system, the Omega space ground system. The
question is whether we can generalize our results to other target systems that BluGen might be
called upon to analyze. Having an insufficient sample size (e.g., a sample of one) would normally be considered a threat to external validity. However, while data from additional investigations conducted against other system types would be welcomed, we do not expect that the
results would be materially different in other settings based on the nature of the two hypotheses that we are assessing: time savings and increased coverage.
Threat: Time results related to H2 do not generalize to larger systems. With respect to other system sizes, we have attack and node-related data on eleven previously executed EVRA selected risk assessment studies completed since 2009, as shown in Figure 18.

Figure 18: Attacks Analyzed vs. System Node Counts
In this context, the term “node” equates to “computer,” a general kind of asset in
BluGen parlance. As the graph shows, the number of attacks chosen by SAs to analyze and
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score has tended to grow as a roughly linear function of the number of cyber nodes in the target system. As the score for a given attack generally requires a discussion among SAs, the
more attacks to be scored, the more total time required to conduct the required discussions.
We thus argue that our time results should remain valid across systems of different sizes, as
measured by total node count, thus supporting H2 for other systems.
The nature of the BluGen exposure algorithm is on the order of O(n) with worst case
O(n2), where n is the number of assets. The criticality analytic has similar complexity. We
base the complexity estimate on the four major nested loops of the exposure algorithm. Below
is a simplification of the nested loop procedure:
•

Loop A: Consider each asset instance in the environment (n items)
•

Loop B: Consider each offensive capability mapped to the asset’s type (m items)
•

Loop C: Consider defensive solution mapped to the offensive capability
•

Loop D: Consider each defensive capability mapped to the defensive solution

We regard the processing time for Loops B, C, and D as equating to a constant factor.
On average, we expect that the number of offensive capabilities (Loop B) mapped to an asset
instance, m, to be less than 100; the current maximum is 96 and the mean is 34. We expect
the number of solutions mapped to an offensive capability (Loop C) to be low (<10) and the
number of defensive capabilities mapped to a defensive solution (Loop D) to be even lower
(<5) on average. These numbers are based on our experience populating the RefCat thus far.
Thus, in summary, the computational complexity of exposure is on the order O(n) or linear
complexity.
Threat: EVRA does not generalize to other risk assessment methods. Another possible threat to the external validity is our choice of the comparison methodology, EVRA. If
EVRA is not truly representative of attack-based methodologies, against which H2 and H3
comparisons are made, then the argument for external validity is weakened.
However, EVRA conforms to the overall model of the NIST 800-30 Framework
(National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2012), which is a commonly accepted approach and a key part of the broadly cited RMF. One notable variance from 800-30 is
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EVRA’s use of Level of Effort (LOE)9 in place of likelihood of successful attack on the Y
axis. However, we argue that LOE is a legitimate proxy for likelihood in much the same way
that we argue that BluGen’s exposure method is proxy for likelihood. Other methodologies
depend on similar arguments. Indeed, until the community moves away from subjective SA
scoring and can collect and analyze sufficient empirical attack data from which to establish
frequentist probabilities to support a probability-based Y axis, such arguments are the best we
currently have.
To contrast, the analytics that conduct analogous scoring in BluGen operate at machine speeds against data sets that are orders of magnitude smaller than what one would consider to be on the scale of “big data.” Thus, we do not expect the set of BluGen algorithms
that implement the analytics to encounter a times/space wall for more complex cyber systems
than those we have thus far analyzed.
Threat: EVRA team does not generalize to other teams. Table 18 identified the team that
executed the EVRA assessment. To evaluate this threat, our main point of comparison is the
previously mentioned work of Hallberg (Hallberg et al., 2017). Like the twenty survey respondents in Hallberg’s research, the EVRA team members all possess university degrees and
have a range of cyber assessment expertise and experience. Hallberg’s respondents ranged in
age from 29 to 64 years, whereas the EVRA team members are all under 30. A potential limitation to the EVRA team, then, is years of experience, which operates under the premise that
additional years of experience correlates to increased expertise for security risk assessment.
However, we note that Hallberg concluded the following:
“…it cannot be stated that experts have a higher consensus than non-experts when
the probability and the severity of information security incidents are rated.”

9

In some applications of EVRA, such as that described in this dissertation, the SAs score Level of Ca-

pability (LOC) rather than Level of Effort (LOE). The former refers to levels of cyber offensive capability in a
capability-based threat model, whereas LOE refers to the SA’s estimate of “effort” (resources-time/money).
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Other Validities: Internal, Construct, Convergent, and Discriminant
H2 and H3 are about comparing selected quantities (time/coverage) between BluGen and
EVRA. We argue that internal validity does not apply, as we are not attempting to establish
causality in these hypotheses. Likewise, as we are not directly testing a theoretical model in
those hypotheses, construct, convergent, and discriminant validities do not apply.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS
In 2018, the cyber risk assessment and mitigation process tends to be an SA-intensive
effort that is slow, expensive, and has generally poor reproducibility. We again quote Hallberg (Hallberg et al., 2017): "The ratings of probability and severity are not reliable enough
between raters to be considered a sound basis for the quantification of information security
risks." However, given the ubiquity and critical uses to which cyber is increasingly put, we
suggest that the importance of reliable and timely cyber risk assessment results has never been
greater. Our original research question was:
“Is there a new approach to mission-cyber risk assessment that can significantly close the following gaps associated with what is typically seen in manually
executed assessments: improved repeatability and reproducibility of results ("repeatability/reproducibility gap"), improved coverage of the attack surface analyzed ("coverage gap"), and decreased analyst time required ("time gap”)?”
In this dissertation, we introduced BluGen, an automated risk assessment approach
that, rather than attempting to enumerate vulnerabilities and possible attack events, focuses
instead on underlying attacker capabilities and computes asset exposure to those capabilities
along with a rolled-up level of mission consequence. We asserted that BluGen could address
the gaps in the research question. To explore whether the evidence supported the assertions,
we conducted a comparative study that focused on a target space system, comparing BluGen
and a representative attack-centric methodology called EVRA. The basis of comparison centered on three hypotheses tied to the gaps in the research question above (repeatability/reproducibility, time, coverage). Our investigation found support for the hypotheses.
It is our hope that the contribution of BluGen to the knowledge base will help the field
of cyber risk assessment and mitigation to become more systematic in its approach and more
apt to leverage collected cyber knowledge rather than relying solely on the judgments of individual SAs.
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Much work remains to be done. In the context of BluGen, the following elements represent a sampling of areas of possible future work.
(1) Formal Hypothesis Testing. To strengthen external validity of the hypotheses H2 and
H3, formal hypothesis testing in a controlled experiment could be pursued.
(2) Utility of BluGen to SAs. The perceived utility of BluGen to working SAs could be
assessed using survey methods.
(3) Assess Utility of Mitigation Recommendations. Experimental tests of the degree to
which implementations of the mitigation recommendations from BluGen hold up
against anticipated threat actors could be evaluated.
(4) Explore Empirical Validation of BluGen RefCat. One could evaluate the process of
empirical validation of RefCat contents using actual cyber incident data.
(5) Willingness to Review and Contribute. A study to examine the extent to which the
broader cyber community is willing to reuse, contribute to, and peer review BluGen
RefCat content could be undertaken.
(6) Use of BluGen for other Threat Types. The expansion of BluGen to other threat
types besides cyber (e.g., kinetic threats, electromagnetic threats) could be examined.
At issue would be how well BluGen analytics and BluGen’s capability-based representation of threats and mitigations work.
(7) Real-Time BluGen. An examination of the degree to which BluGen could be extended
to do “real-time” risk assessment could be undertaken. Such a tool could be driven by
data from live update feeds of threat data and system configuration data.
(8) Tradespace Analysis. Tradespace analysis of possible capability-based mitigation architectures is a rich area for possible future investigation. In this context, one could
build a recommendation engine that selects mitigations not just on the basis of the perceived effectiveness of individual defensive solutions, but on the effectiveness of overall mitigation architectures composed of those solutions, taking into consideration various SA-weighted measures of cost and benefit.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A - Additional Information on BluGen
Appendix A provides additional information on BluGen, broken into two sections:
(1) setting up and running BluGen and (2) BluGen data capture. We do not summarize
BluGen itself, as that was done in the earlier section called Artifact Design and in the 2017
HICSS paper (Llanso et al., 2017).

Setting Up and Running the BluGen Software
BluGen software is managed in the SVN repository, which should already be installed.
To check out the software, follow these steps:
1. Create an empty folder. Below, I called it BluGen-1.0Demo
2. Change directories to the folder
3. Right-click mouse and choose “SVN Checkout…”

4. The dialog box below appears. Enter the appropriate URL and then click OK. The
checkout process will commence.
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5. The checkout process takes several minutes. When the process is complete, the following
window contents will appear.

The folder appears as follows once the checkout is complete.
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6. Start the NetBeans IDE (version 8.2 used below), choose Open Project… from the File
menu, which results in the dialog below. Then choose “trunk” in the file list.

For the sake of brevity, we do not show the installation process for installing the
BluGen software nor do we show the importation process for Omega descriptive data10.
To start the BluGen tool, the user double-clicks the mouse on the BluGen icon on the
desktop (Figure 19).

Figure 19: Desktop with BluGen icon
The tool starts up and presents the user with a list of projects (Figure 20). A project is
a description of a target system to be analyzed. Omega has already been loaded into a project
called “Space Example”.

10

To import the data, the user prepares a multi-tab spreadsheet populated with descriptive data for

Omega. The user then executes a command in BluGen to load this data into a newly created BluGen project.
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Figure 20: BluGen Projects
To view details about the risk analysis of Omega, the user selects the “Space Example” project with the mouse and clicks the “Open” button. The corresponding project window
opens (Figure 21). Note the multi-tab interface for the project description. The main tab,
shown below, captures the project name, description, threat model to use, tier of threat actor
to consider, and risk tolerance values.

Figure 21: Project Windows – Main tab

Figure 22 shows a view of the entity tab for Omega. Entities include missions, assets, and data
types. The window shows only a subset of the entities in Omega.
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Figure 22: Project Windows – Entity Tab
Figure 23 shows a view of the entity relationships tab for Omega. For example, one of
the entity relationship types is “InheritsCapabilitiesFrom,” which indicates that an asset inherits the defensive mitigations from another asset.

Figure 23: Project Windows – Entity Relationships Tab
Figure 24 shows the mission criticality scores for Omega. The user provides this data
as input to BluGen. Each row of data in the table shows mission impact scores for breach of
confidentiality, integrity, and availability for each viable combination of (Mission, Asset, and
Data).
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Figure 24: Project Windows – Criticality Tab
Figure 25 shows the analysis tab for Omega. The analyst clicks on the various buttons
to run BluGen analytics. The buttons used for this analysis are the buttons to generate a risk
plot and to generate a mitigations report.

Figure 25: Project Windows – Analysis Tab
Figure 26 show a risk plot generated for Omega. Each data point in the scatterplot represents an asset in the Project model provided to BluGen.
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Figure 26: Risk Plot Generated for Omega
Figure 27 shows a portion of the mitigation report BluGen generates for Omega. Each
row in the table represents an asset. Mitigation possibilities for the asset are shown on the
right-hand side of the report.

Figure 27: Mitigation Report Generated for Omega
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Omega Data Capture
This section discusses dissertation data capture. In this context, by data, we mean processing data generated by the BluGen tool needed for evaluating hypothesis H3. We first
show the custom code that we wrote to extract the data, and then we show the data itself.

Custom Source Code for Dissertation Hypothesis H3 (BluGen)
For the dissertation, I wrote custom source code to capture data processed by the
BluGen exposure analytic as it worked its way through computing exposure for assets in
Omega. This code, which is not part of the main BluGen source code base, is shown in below.
package jhuapl.edu.blugen.ui;
import java.util.ArrayList;
import java.util.HashMap;
import jhuapl.edu.blugen.EntityTypeTaxonomyManager;
import jhuapl.edu.blugen.ReferenceCatalogManager;
import jhuapl.edu.blugen.model.EntityType;
import jhuapl.edu.blugen.model.EntityTypeTaxonomy;
import jhuapl.edu.blugen.model.refcat.Ability;
import jhuapl.edu.blugen.model.refcat.Ability2Ability;
import jhuapl.edu.blugen.model.refcat.ReferenceCatalog;
/**
* This code was written by Thomas H. Llanso in support of his dissertation.
*
* @author Thomas H. Llanso
*/
public class Dissertation {
/**
* This method traverses the reference catalog for each asset type found in the
* Space Example project, showing coverage and collecting descriptive
* statistics along the way.
*/
public void execute() {
EntityTypeTaxonomyManager ettm = EntityTypeTaxonomyManager.getInstance();
EntityTypeTaxonomy att = ettm.getEntityTypeTaxonomy();
ReferenceCatalogManager rcm = ReferenceCatalogManager.getInstance();
ReferenceCatalog rc = rcm.getReferenceCatalog();
System.out.println("******* BluGen Dissertation Output *******");
int assetTypeCount = 0;
ArrayList<Ability> rcList = new ArrayList<>();
ArrayList<Ability> bsList = new ArrayList<>();
ArrayList<Ability> bcList = new ArrayList<>();
int[] mappings = new int[3];
for (EntityType et : att.getEntityTypes().values())
if (dissertation_assetTypeWasUsed(et)) {
dissertation_ShowCoverageForEntityType(rc, et, rcList, bsList,
bcList, mappings);
assetTypeCount++;
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}
System.out.println("\n
---> STATISTICS <---");
System.out.println("
Asset Types (AT) count: "+assetTypeCount);
System.out.println(" Offensive Capability (OC) Count: "+rcList.size());
System.out.println(" Defensive Solution (DS) Count: "+bsList.size());
System.out.println(" Defensive Capability (DC) Count: "+bcList.size());
System.out.println("");
System.out.println("
OC --> AT Mapping Count: "+mappings[0]);
System.out.println("
BS --> RC Mapping Count: "+mappings[1]);
System.out.println("
BC --> BS Mapping Count: "+mappings[2]);
}
/**
* THis method returns TRUE if a given asset type was used in the Space Example.
*
* @param et Asset type to lookup
* @return TRUE if present, FALSE if not.
*/
boolean dissertation_assetTypeWasUsed(EntityType et) {
// Entity types in Space Example
String[] aList = {
"Aggregate Asset",
"Authentication Mechanism",
"Computing Device",
"Endpoint Cryptographic Mechanism",
"Endpoint Device",
"General User",
"Key Management Mechanism",
"Network Device",
"Non-IT Roles",
"Physical Space",
"Security Admin Roles",
"System Admin Roles",
"Wired-Link"
};
boolean found = false;
for (String name : aList) {
if (name.equalsIgnoreCase(et.getName())) {
found = true;
break;
}
}
return found;
}
/**
* Show the coverage for a given asset type.
*
* @param rc Reference Catalog to use
* @param entityType Asset type to show coverage for
* @param rcList Accumulating list of offensive capabilities
* @param bsList Accumulating list of defensive solutions
* @param bcList Accumulating list of defensive capabilities
* @param mappings Accumulating list of mappings between entities
*/
void dissertation_ShowCoverageForEntityType(
ReferenceCatalog rc,
EntityType entityType,
ArrayList<Ability> rcList,
ArrayList<Ability> bsList,
ArrayList<Ability> bcList,
int[] mappings) {
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System.out.println("\nASSET-TYPE: "+entityType.getName());
// Show red capabilities and corresponding blue solutions and component blue capabilities
for (Ability redAbility : rc.getRedAbilitiesThatThreatenEntityType(entityType, null, true)) {
dissertation_addAbility(rcList, redAbility);
mappings[0]++;
System.out.println(" OC: "+dissertation_trim(redAbility.getName()));
HashMap<Ability, Double> map = rc.getBlueAbilitiesThatCounterRedAbility(redAbility, null);
for (Ability bs : map.keySet()) {
System.out.println("
DS: "+
dissertation_trim(bs.getName().substring(4))); //+" ("+bs.getAbilityCategory()+")");
mappings[1]++;
dissertation_addAbility(bsList, bs);
ArrayList<Ability2Ability> list = rc.getComposedOf(bs);
for (Ability2Ability a2a : list) {
Ability bc = a2a.getAbility2();
mappings[2]++;
dissertation_addAbility(bcList, bc);
System.out.println("
DC: "+
dissertation_trim(bc.getName().substring(4))); //+" ("+bc.getAbilityCategory()+")");
}
}
}
}
/**
* Trim output string to no longer than 100 characters
*
* @param s String to trim
* @return s trimmed string
*/
String dissertation_trim(String s) {
final int m = 115;
int len = s.length() > m ? m : s.length();
String k = s.substring(0, len);
if (k.length() == m) k += "...";
return k;
}
/**
* Add an ability to the list as long as it is not already on the list.
*
* @param list list to receive the ability
* @param a ability
*/
void dissertation_addAbility(ArrayList<Ability> list, Ability a) {
boolean found = false;
for (Ability i : list)
if (i.getName().equalsIgnoreCase(a.getName())) {
found = true;
break;
}
if (!found)
list.add(a);
}
}
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To summarize the code above, for each asset type that appears in Omega, the code
shows the offensive capabilities (OC) mapped to the asset types, and, for each threat, the defensive solutions (DS) that mitigate the threat, and the defensive capabilities (DC) that compose those solutions. In addition, the code computes summary statistics at the very end.

BluGen Output to Show Coverage
A sampling of the output resulting from a run of the Java code for Omega is shown for
below. The descriptive statistics that normally appear at the end of the multi-page output is
instead show in Figure 28 for convenience.

Figure 28: BluGen Descriptive Statics for Omega Coverage
******* BluGen Dissertation Output *******
ASSET-TYPE: General User
OC: Effectively uses highly-sophisticated techniques in social settings for elicitation
DS: Solution to Highly Sophisticated Social Engineering Full GR
DC: Mitigate Highly Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation G
DS: Solution to Highly Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation G
DC: Mitigate Highly Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation R
DS: Solution to Highly Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation R
DC: Mitigate Highly Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation GR
OC: Effectively uses highly sophisticated social engineering attacks
DS: Solution to Highly Sophisticated Social Engineering R
DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation G
OC: Effectively uses moderately-sophisticated techniques in social settings for elicitation
DS: Solution to Moderately Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation Full GR
DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation G
DS: Solution to Moderately Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation R
DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation GR
DS: Solution to Moderately Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation G
DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation R
OC: Effectively uses moderately sophisticated techniques to recruit persons for espionage and sabot...
DS: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Recruitment Techniques
DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Recruitment Techniques
OC: Effectively uses highly sophisticated techniques to recruit persons for espionage and sabotage
DS: Mitigate Highly Sophisticated Recruitment Techniques
DC: Mitigate Highly Sophisticated Recruitment Techniques
OC: Effectively uses rudimentary social engineering attacks
DS: Solution to Rudimentary Social Engineering R
DC: Mitigate Rudimentary Social Engineering R
DS: Solution to Rudimentary Social Engineering Full GR
DC: Mitigate Rudimentary Social Engineering GR
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DS: Solution to Rudimentary Social Engineering G
DC: Mitigate Rudimentary Social Engineering G
OC: Effectively uses moderately sophisticated social engineering attacks
DS: Solution to Moderately Sophisticated Social Engineering G
DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Social Engineering G
DS: Solution to Moderately Sophisticated Social Engineering R
DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Social Engineering R
DS: Solution to Moderately Sophisticated Social Engineering Full GR
DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Social Engineering GR
ASSET-TYPE: Endpoint Cryptographic Mechanism
OC: Defeat Commercial Crypto using cryptanalysis
DS: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto via military Grade Encryption
DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto using military grade encryption
DS: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto using cryptanalysis
DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto using cryptanalysis
OC: Defeat a weak commercial cryptographic mechanism in a computing device
DS: Mitigate ability to defeat a weak commercial cryptographic mechanism in a computing device
DC: Mitigate ability to defeat a weak commercial cryptographic mechanism in a computing device
OC: Defeats Strong Commercial Crypto by obtaining key material
DS: Mitigate ability to defeat Strong Commercial Crypto by obtaining key material
DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Strong Commercial Crypto by obtaining key material
OC: Can compromise data on computing devices, wired links and cryptographic mechanisms that are unprotected
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links that are unprotected using cryptography
DC: Mitigate ability to defeat a weak commercial cryptographic mechanism in a computing device
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links that are unprotected using cryptography and physical protections
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to poorly-protected, unclassified systems (Protection 1) with minimal st...
DC: Mitigate ability to defeat a weak commercial cryptographic mechanism in a computing device
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links that are unprotected using physical access controls
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to poorly-protected, unclassified systems (Protection 1) with minimal st...
OC: Can compromise data on computing devices, wired links and cryptographic mechanisms with simple protections
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with simple protections using physical access controls
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to access-controlled unclassified systems (Protection 2, or less) with ...
OC: Can compromise data on computing devices, wired links and cryptographic mechanisms with highly-sophisticated protec...
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with highly-sophisticated protections using cryptography
DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Military Grade Crypto by obtaining key material
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with highly-sophisticated protections using cryptography and physical prot...
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems with light or heavy physical protection, classifi...
DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Military Grade Crypto by obtaining key material (faster than T5)
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with highly-sophisticated protections using physical access controls
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems with light or heavy physical protection (protecti...
OC: Can compromise data on computing devices, wired links and cryptographic mechanisms with extra highly-sophisticated ...
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with extra highly-sophisticated protections using physical access controls...
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems in SCIFs (Protection 5) with minimal stealth
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with extra highly-sophisticated protections using cryptography
DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Military Grade Crypto by obtaining key material (faster than T5)
OC: Defeats Military Grade Crypto by obtaining key material
DS: Mitigate ability to defeat Military Grade Crypto by obtaining key material
DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Military Grade Crypto by obtaining key material
OC: Can compromise data on computing devices, wired links and cryptographic mechanisms with rudimentary protections
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with rudimentary protections using physical access controls
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems with light physical protection (Protection 3 or ...
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with rudimentary protections using cryptography
DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Strong Commercial Crypto by obtaining key material
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with simple protections using cryptography and physical protections
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems with light physical protection (Protection 3 or ...
DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Strong Commercial Crypto by obtaining key material
OC: Defeats Military Grade Crypto by obtaining key material (faster than T5)
DS: Mitigate ability to defeat Military Grade Crypto by obtaining key material (faster than T5)
DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Military Grade Crypto by obtaining key material (faster than T5)
OC: Can compromise data on computing devices, wired links and cryptographic mechanisms with moderately-sophisticated pr...
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using cryptography reducing vuln...
DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto using cryptanalysis
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using cryptography and physical ...
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to access-controlled unclassified systems (Protection 1-2) with high s...
DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto using military grade encryption
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DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using physical access controls a...
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to access-controlled unclassified systems (Protection 1-2) with high s...
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using physical access controls b...
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems with light or heavy physical protection (protecti...
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using cryptography and physical ...
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems in SCIFs (Protection 5) with minimal stealth
DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto using cryptanalysis
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using cryptography and physical ...
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems in SCIFs (Protection 5) with minimal stealth
DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto using military grade encryption
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using cryptography and physical ...
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems with light or heavy physical protection (protecti...
DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto using military grade encryption
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using physical access controls c...
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems in SCIFs (Protection 5) with minimal stealth
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using cryptography using stronge...
DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto using military grade encryption
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with rudimentary protections using cryptography and physical protections a...
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to access-controlled unclassified systems (Protection 1-2) with high s...
DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto using cryptanalysis
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using cryptography and physical ...
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems with light or heavy physical protection (protecti...
DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto using cryptanalysis
ASSET-TYPE: Network Device
OC: Use compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through highly-sophisticated social engineering/elicitat...
DS: Mitigate use of compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through highly-sophisticated social engineer...
DC: Mitigate Highly Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation G
DC: Mitigate Highly Sophisticated Social Engineering GR
DS: Mitigate use of compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through highly-sophisticated social engineer...
DC: Mitigate Highly Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation R
DC: Mitigate Highly Sophisticated Social Engineering GR
DS: Mitigate use of compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through highly-sophisticated social engineer...
DC: Mitigate Highly Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation GR
DC: Mitigate Highly Sophisticated Social Engineering GR
OC: Exploit Known and Unknown Weak Configurations Settings (CCEs) in Software (OS, firmware, Application, Hypervisor) o...
DS: BS: Detect and Respond to exploitation of Known Weak Configurations Settings (CCEs) in Software (OS, firmware, Appl...
DC: BG: Protect against Known Weak Configurations Settings (CCEs)
OC: Use compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through basic recruitment through moderately-sophisticat...
DS: Mitigate use of compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through basic recruitment through moderately...
DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Recruitment Techniques
OC: Use compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through rudimentary social engineering
DS: Mitigate use of compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through rudimentary social engineering G
DC: Mitigate Rudimentary Social Engineering G
DS: Mitigate use of compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through rudimentary social engineering R
DC: Mitigate Rudimentary Social Engineering R
DS: Mitigate use of compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through rudimentary social engineering GR
DC: Mitigate Rudimentary Social Engineering GR
OC: Exploit Known and Unknown Weak Configurations Settings (CCEs) in Software (OS, firmware, Application, Hypervisor) o...
DS: BS: Protect against Known Weak Configurations Settings (CCEs) in Software (OS, firmware, Application, Hypervisor) o...
DC: BG: Protect against Known Weak Configurations Settings (CCEs)
OC: Use compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through moderately-sophisticated social engineering/elic...
DS: Mitigate use of compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through moderately-sophisticated social engi...
DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Social Engineering GR
DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation GR
DS: Mitigate use of compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through moderately-sophisticated social engi...
DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Social Engineering G
DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation G
DS: Mitigate use of compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through moderately-sophisticated social engi...
DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Social Engineering R
DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation R
OC: Exploit Known and Unknown Weak Configurations Settings (CCEs) in Software (OS, firmware, Application, Hypervisor) o...
DS: BS: Limit damage from Known Weak Configurations Settings (CCEs) in Software (OS, firmware, Application, Hypervisor)...
DC: BG: Protect against Known Weak Configurations Settings (CCEs)
OC: Can develop and deliver high-stealth SW implants for SW of network appliances and embedded systems
DS: Mitigate SW Injection: SW Hash-Based WL TT4
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DC: Mitigate Malicious and Unauthorized Code emphasis Hash based Whitelisting to block execution
DS: Mitigate SW Injection: SW Black Listing TT4
DC: Mitigate Malicious and Unauthorized Code emphasis Black Listing
DS: Mitigate SW Injection: SW Location WL + Hash-based Removal TT4
DC: Mitigate Malicious and Unauthorized Code emphasis Locational WL with Hash based Removal of Malicious Code
DS: Mitigate SW Injection: SW Locational WL TT4
DC: Mitigate Malicious and Unauthorized Code emphasis Location Whitelisting to block execution
OC: Exploit Known Vulnerabilities (CVEs and CWEs) in Software (OS, firmware, Application, Hypervisor) of computers, sma...
DS: Mitigate Exploitation of known Vulnerabilities CVEs and CWEs) in Software (OS, firmware, Application, Hypervisor) o...
DC: Mitigate Exploitation of known Vulnerabilities CVEs and CWEs) in Software (OS, firmware, Application, Hypervisor) o...
OC: Can compromise data on computing devices, wired links and cryptographic mechanisms that are unprotected
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links that are unprotected using cryptography
DC: Mitigate ability to defeat a weak commercial cryptographic mechanism in a computing device
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links that are unprotected using cryptography and physical protections
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to poorly-protected, unclassified systems (Protection 1) with minimal st...
DC: Mitigate ability to defeat a weak commercial cryptographic mechanism in a computing device
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links that are unprotected using physical access controls
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to poorly-protected, unclassified systems (Protection 1) with minimal st...
OC: Can compromise data on computing devices, wired links and cryptographic mechanisms with simple protections
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with simple protections using physical access controls
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to access-controlled unclassified systems (Protection 2, or less) with ...
OC: Use compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through highly-sophisticated recruitment for espionage/...
DS: Mitigate use of compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through highly-sophisticated recruitment fo...
DC: Mitigate Highly Sophisticated Recruitment Techniques
OC: Inject Hardware
DS: Mitigate hardware injection
DC: Mitigate Hardware Injection
OC: Can compromise data on computing devices, wired links and cryptographic mechanisms with highly-sophisticated protec...
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with highly-sophisticated protections using cryptography
DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Military Grade Crypto by obtaining key material
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with highly-sophisticated protections using cryptography and physical prot...
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems with light or heavy physical protection, classifi...
DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Military Grade Crypto by obtaining key material (faster than T5)
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with highly-sophisticated protections using physical access controls
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems with light or heavy physical protection (protecti...
OC: Can compromise data on computing devices, wired links and cryptographic mechanisms with extra highly-sophisticated ...
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with extra highly-sophisticated protections using physical access controls...
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems in SCIFs (Protection 5) with minimal stealth
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with extra highly-sophisticated protections using cryptography
DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Military Grade Crypto by obtaining key material (faster than T5)
OC: Can compromise data on computing devices, wired links and cryptographic mechanisms with rudimentary protections
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with rudimentary protections using physical access controls
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems with light physical protection (Protection 3 or ...
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with rudimentary protections using cryptography
DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Strong Commercial Crypto by obtaining key material
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with simple protections using cryptography and physical protections
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems with light physical protection (Protection 3 or ...
DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Strong Commercial Crypto by obtaining key material
OC: Find and Exploit Unknown Vulnerabilities in OS, firmware or application software on computing devices
DS: Mitigate Exploitation of unknown Vulnerabilities in OS, firmware or application software on computing devices
DC: Mitigate Exploitation of unknown Vulnerabilities in OS, firmware or application software on computing devices
DC: Mitigate Exploitation of unknown Vulnerabilities in hypervisor software on computing devices
OC: Exploit Hardware Vulnerabilities
DS: Mitigate hardware vulnerability
DC: Mitigate Vulnerable Hardware
OC: Can compromise data on computing devices, wired links and cryptographic mechanisms with moderately-sophisticated pr...
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using cryptography reducing vuln...
DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto using cryptanalysis
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using cryptography and physical ...
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to access-controlled unclassified systems (Protection 1-2) with high s...
DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto using military grade encryption
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using physical access controls a...
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to access-controlled unclassified systems (Protection 1-2) with high s...
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using physical access controls b...
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems with light or heavy physical protection (protecti...
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using cryptography and physical ...
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DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems in SCIFs (Protection 5) with minimal stealth
DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto using cryptanalysis
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using cryptography and physical ...
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems in SCIFs (Protection 5) with minimal stealth
DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto using military grade encryption
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using cryptography and physical ...
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems with light or heavy physical protection (protecti...
DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto using military grade encryption
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using physical access controls c...
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems in SCIFs (Protection 5) with minimal stealth
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using cryptography using stronge...
DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto using military grade encryption
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with rudimentary protections using cryptography and physical protections a...
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to access-controlled unclassified systems (Protection 1-2) with high s...
DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto using cryptanalysis
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using cryptography and physical ...
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems with light or heavy physical protection (protecti...
DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto using cryptanalysis
ASSET-TYPE: System Admin Roles
OC: Effectively uses highly-sophisticated techniques in social settings for elicitation
DS: Solution to Highly Sophisticated Social Engineering Full GR
DC: Mitigate Highly Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation G
DS: Solution to Highly Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation G
DC: Mitigate Highly Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation R
DS: Solution to Highly Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation R
DC: Mitigate Highly Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation GR
OC: Effectively uses highly sophisticated social engineering attacks
DS: Solution to Highly Sophisticated Social Engineering R
DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation G
OC: Effectively uses moderately-sophisticated techniques in social settings for elicitation
DS: Solution to Moderately Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation Full GR
DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation G
DS: Solution to Moderately Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation R
DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation GR
DS: Solution to Moderately Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation G
DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation R
OC: Effectively uses moderately sophisticated techniques to recruit persons for espionage and sabot...
DS: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Recruitment Techniques
DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Recruitment Techniques
OC: Effectively uses highly sophisticated techniques to recruit persons for espionage and sabotage
DS: Mitigate Highly Sophisticated Recruitment Techniques
DC: Mitigate Highly Sophisticated Recruitment Techniques
OC: Effectively uses rudimentary social engineering attacks
DS: Solution to Rudimentary Social Engineering R
DC: Mitigate Rudimentary Social Engineering R
DS: Solution to Rudimentary Social Engineering Full GR
DC: Mitigate Rudimentary Social Engineering GR
DS: Solution to Rudimentary Social Engineering G
DC: Mitigate Rudimentary Social Engineering G
OC: Effectively uses moderately sophisticated social engineering attacks
DS: Solution to Moderately Sophisticated Social Engineering G
DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Social Engineering G
DS: Solution to Moderately Sophisticated Social Engineering R
DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Social Engineering R
DS: Solution to Moderately Sophisticated Social Engineering Full GR
DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Social Engineering GR
ASSET-TYPE: Computing Device
OC: Use compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through highly-sophisticated social engineering/elicitat...
DS: Mitigate use of compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through highly-sophisticated social engineer...
DC: Mitigate Highly Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation G
DC: Mitigate Highly Sophisticated Social Engineering GR
DS: Mitigate use of compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through highly-sophisticated social engineer...
DC: Mitigate Highly Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation R
DC: Mitigate Highly Sophisticated Social Engineering GR
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DS: Mitigate use of compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through highly-sophisticated social engineer...
DC: Mitigate Highly Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation GR
DC: Mitigate Highly Sophisticated Social Engineering GR
OC: Exploit Known and Unknown Weak Configurations Settings (CCEs) in Software (OS, firmware, Application, Hypervisor) o...
DS: BS: Detect and Respond to exploitation of Known Weak Configurations Settings (CCEs) in Software (OS, firmware, Appl...
DC: BG: Protect against Known Weak Configurations Settings (CCEs)
OC: Use compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through basic recruitment through moderately-sophisticat...
DS: Mitigate use of compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through basic recruitment through moderately...
DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Recruitment Techniques
OC: Use compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through rudimentary social engineering
DS: Mitigate use of compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through rudimentary social engineering G
DC: Mitigate Rudimentary Social Engineering G
DS: Mitigate use of compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through rudimentary social engineering R
DC: Mitigate Rudimentary Social Engineering R
DS: Mitigate use of compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through rudimentary social engineering GR
DC: Mitigate Rudimentary Social Engineering GR
OC: Exploit Known and Unknown Weak Configurations Settings (CCEs) in Software (OS, firmware, Application, Hypervisor) o...
DS: BS: Protect against Known Weak Configurations Settings (CCEs) in Software (OS, firmware, Application, Hypervisor) o...
DC: BG: Protect against Known Weak Configurations Settings (CCEs)
OC: Use compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through moderately-sophisticated social engineering/elic...
DS: Mitigate use of compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through moderately-sophisticated social engi...
DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Social Engineering GR
DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation GR
DS: Mitigate use of compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through moderately-sophisticated social engi...
DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Social Engineering G
DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation G
DS: Mitigate use of compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through moderately-sophisticated social engi...
DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Social Engineering R
DC: Mitigate Moderately Sophisticated Social Mining for Elicitation R
OC: Exploit Known and Unknown Weak Configurations Settings (CCEs) in Software (OS, firmware, Application, Hypervisor) o...
DS: BS: Limit damage from Known Weak Configurations Settings (CCEs) in Software (OS, firmware, Application, Hypervisor)...
DC: BG: Protect against Known Weak Configurations Settings (CCEs)
OC: Can compromise data on computing devices, wired links and cryptographic mechanisms that are unprotected
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links that are unprotected using cryptography
DC: Mitigate ability to defeat a weak commercial cryptographic mechanism in a computing device
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links that are unprotected using cryptography and physical protections
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to poorly-protected, unclassified systems (Protection 1) with minimal st...
DC: Mitigate ability to defeat a weak commercial cryptographic mechanism in a computing device
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links that are unprotected using physical access controls
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to poorly-protected, unclassified systems (Protection 1) with minimal st...
OC: Can compromise data on computing devices, wired links and cryptographic mechanisms with simple protections
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with simple protections using physical access controls
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to access-controlled unclassified systems (Protection 2, or less) with ...
OC: Use compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through highly-sophisticated recruitment for espionage/...
DS: Mitigate use of compromised humans to attack data on devices and links through highly-sophisticated recruitment fo...
DC: Mitigate Highly Sophisticated Recruitment Techniques
OC: Inject Hardware
DS: Mitigate hardware injection
DC: Mitigate Hardware Injection
OC: Can compromise data on computing devices, wired links and cryptographic mechanisms with highly-sophisticated protec...
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with highly-sophisticated protections using cryptography
DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Military Grade Crypto by obtaining key material
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with highly-sophisticated protections using cryptography and physical prot...
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems with light or heavy physical protection, classifi...
DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Military Grade Crypto by obtaining key material (faster than T5)
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with highly-sophisticated protections using physical access controls
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems with light or heavy physical protection (protecti...
OC: Can compromise data on computing devices, wired links and cryptographic mechanisms with extra highly-sophisticated ...
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with extra highly-sophisticated protections using physical access controls...
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems in SCIFs (Protection 5) with minimal stealth
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with extra highly-sophisticated protections using cryptography
DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Military Grade Crypto by obtaining key material (faster than T5)
OC: Can compromise data on computing devices, wired links and cryptographic mechanisms with rudimentary protections
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with rudimentary protections using physical access controls
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems with light physical protection (Protection 3 or ...
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with rudimentary protections using cryptography
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DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Strong Commercial Crypto by obtaining key material
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with simple protections using cryptography and physical protections
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems with light physical protection (Protection 3 or ...
DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Strong Commercial Crypto by obtaining key material
OC: Exploit Hardware Vulnerabilities
DS: Mitigate hardware vulnerability
DC: Mitigate Vulnerable Hardware
OC: Can compromise data on computing devices, wired links and cryptographic mechanisms with moderately-sophisticated pr...
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using cryptography reducing vuln...
DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto using cryptanalysis
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using cryptography and physical ...
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to access-controlled unclassified systems (Protection 1-2) with high s...
DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto using military grade encryption
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using physical access controls a...
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to access-controlled unclassified systems (Protection 1-2) with high s...
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using physical access controls b...
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems with light or heavy physical protection (protecti...
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using cryptography and physical ...
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems in SCIFs (Protection 5) with minimal stealth
DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto using cryptanalysis
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using cryptography and physical ...
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems in SCIFs (Protection 5) with minimal stealth
DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto using military grade encryption
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using cryptography and physical ...
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems with light or heavy physical protection (protecti...
DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto using military grade encryption
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using physical access controls c...
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems in SCIFs (Protection 5) with minimal stealth
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using cryptography using stronge...
DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto using military grade encryption
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with rudimentary protections using cryptography and physical protections a...
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to access-controlled unclassified systems (Protection 1-2) with high s...
DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto using cryptanalysis
DS: Can mitigate attacks on data on RF Links with moderately-sophisticated protections using cryptography and physical ...
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems with light or heavy physical protection (protecti...
DC: Mitigate ability to defeat Commercial Crypto using cryptanalysis
ASSET-TYPE: Physical Space
OC: Can obtain physical access to classified systems in SCIFs (Protection 5) with minimal stealth
DS: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems in SCIFs (Protection 5) with minimal stealth
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems in SCIFs (Protection 5) with minimal stealth
OC: Can obtain physical access to classified systems with light or heavy physical protection (protection 3-4) with mod...
DS: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems with light or heavy physical protection (protecti...
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems with light or heavy physical protection (protecti...
OC: Can obtain physical access to classified systems with light physical protection (Protection 3 or less) with minim...
DS: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems with light physical protection (Protection 3 or ...
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems with light physical protection (Protection 3 or ...
OC: Can obtain physical access to cryptographic mechanisms and keys (Protection 2.5, or less) with no stealth
DS: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to cryptographic mechanisms and keys (Protection 2.5, or less) with no ...
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to cryptographic mechanisms and keys (Protection 2.5, or less) with no ...
OC: Can obtain physical access to access-controlled unclassified systems (Protection 1-2) with high stealth
DS: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to access-controlled unclassified systems (Protection 1-2) with high s...
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to access-controlled unclassified systems (Protection 1-2) with high s...
OC: Can obtain physical access to classified systems with light or heavy physical protection, classified systems in SC...
DS: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems with light or heavy physical protection, classifi...
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to classified systems with light or heavy physical protection, classifi...
OC: Can obtain physical access to poorly-protected, unclassified systems (Protection 1) with minimal stealth.
DS: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to poorly-protected, unclassified systems (Protection 1) with minimal st...
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to poorly-protected, unclassified systems (Protection 1) with minimal st...
OC: Can obtain physical access to access-controlled unclassified systems (Protection 2, or less) with moderate stealth...
DS: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to access-controlled unclassified systems (Protection 2, or less) with ...
DC: Mitigate ability to obtain physical access to access-controlled unclassified systems (Protection 2, or less) with ...
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Appendix B - Additional Information on EVRA
This appendix provides additional information on EVRA. The appendix is divided into
two sections: (1) a brief summary of the EVRA methodology and (2) detailed results and
timekeeping data for EVRA during its application on the comparative study.

Summary of EVRA Methodology
EVRA analyzes (1) a set of mission/business objectives that depend on a cyber system, (2) cyber threats that could impact mission/business objectives by attacking the underlying system, and (3) details of the cyber system upon which the mission/business objectives
depend. The process is intended to help answer three key questions:
(1) If a threat action was carried out, what would be the mission impact be?
(2) What adversary level of capability (LOC) is required, as estimated along the DSB
scale from I to VI (Gosler & Von Thaer, 2013)?
(3) What mitigation options for are available to deal with the threats, particularly those
that have low LOC and high mission impact?
The EVRA processes (Figure 29) maps well to the NIST risk assessment framework
(National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2012). One difference is that whereas EVRA
uses LOC, NIST uses likelihood of attack. We believe, but lack the empirical data to strongly
support, that LOC correlates to likelihood of attack. The reasoning is that (1) attacker motivation is assumed and (2) by possessing sufficient LOC, attack likelihood goes up.

Figure 29: Summary of the EVRA Methodology
An overview of Figure 29 is as follows. First, SAs obtain data to populate the adversary, mission, and system models. Next, SAs score a set of potential attacks and estimate risk
using the models. Scoring is along a 5-point Likert-style ordinal scale. SAs score attack LOC
and mission impact if the attack is successful. Then the scoring data is entered into a tool
which produces the initial EVRA risk plot. After deciding on possible mitigations and
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rescoring LOC scores appropriately given the hypothetical presence of the mitigations, the
SAs rerun the EVRA tool to obtain an “after” risk plot. The results are then shared with other
stakeholders for decisions on the way forward. As threat, mission, and system change over
time, the entire process iterates.

Omega Data Capture and Timekeeping Data
This section presents detailed results and timekeeping data for the EVRA team. Table
23 shows the scoring table the EVRA team used to record starting node LOC scores and the
corresponding rationale the team recoded for each score.
Table 23: EVRA Starting LOC Scoring and Rationale
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Table 24 shows the shows the scoring table the EVRA team used to record target node LOC
scores and the corresponding rationale for each score.
Table 24: Target LOC Scores and Rationale

Notes kept by the EVRA team during their analysis of Omega are given in Figure 30.
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Figure 30: Notes from EVRA team
Table 25 contains the total hours by day for the EVRA team over the seven-day period
in which they conducted the EVRA analysis of Omega. As shown, the team spent a total of
24.95 hours on the task, with 14.30 hours spent on choosing and scoring attacks for the “before” risk plot (BP) and 10.65 hours on selecting mitigations based on the “before” plot and
scoring LOC assuming the mitigations are in place.
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Table 25: Timekeeping for EVRA Team
Values in the Category column of Table 25 have meanings defined in Table 26, as recorded
by the EVRA team.

Table 26: Timekeeping Categories for EVRA Analysis

